Implications of Sino-American strategic competition on Southeast Asia's post-Cold War regional order by Suryodipuro, Sidharto R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2003-12
Implications of Sino-American strategic competition
on Southeast Asia's post-Cold War regional order
Suryodipuro, Sidharto R.













IMPLICATIONS OF SINO-AMERICAN 
STRATEGIC COMPETITION ON SOUTHEAST ASIA’S 








Thesis Advisor: H. Lyman Miller 
Second Reader: Edward A. Olsen 
 
 


















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, 
VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1.  AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave 
blank)            
2.   REPORT DATE   
December 2003 
3.  REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Implications of Sino-American Strategic 
Competition on Southeast Asia’s Post-Cold War Regional Order 
5.  FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6.  AUTHOR Sidharto R. Suryodipuro  
7.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION  
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11.  SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of 
the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a.  DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Southeast Asia is a maritime crossroad and an arena of strategic great power interaction. The study of 
international politics after the Cold War has rediscovered the importance of regional interaction as the framework for 
understanding countries’ security strategies and the great powers’ impact on specific regions. A review of various 
theories, furthermore, reveals the revival of geopolitics in theoretical constructions and policy formulations. 
This thesis reviews United States-China relations as the independent variable. The U.S. grand strategy has been 
consistent since the first Bush administration, namely to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. The American 
instruments in pursuit of its strategy are derived from its nature as a maritime power. China is a continental power 
that is recently expanding seaward and reemerging as East Asia’s indispensable power. China’s success in promoting 
its vision of order in maritime Southeast Asia will potentially undermine America’s influence. 
Southeast Asia’s regional order, the dependent variable, is dynamic when viewed from its two dimensions: 
time and space. Time refers to historical cycles, while space refers to the diverse views in dealing with the major 
powers, i.e., regional autonomy, a balance of engagement among the great powers and, since the 1990s, stronger 
engagement only with Northeast Asia. This thesis argues that regional identity is the primary driver of Southeast 
Asia’s strategy for regional order. 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS   
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3, 
ASEAN+China, China foreign relations, East Asia, East Asia Economic Caucus, East Asia 
community, grand strategy, maritime, People’s Liberation Army, Southeast Asia, Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone, United States foreign relations, Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, ZOPFAN 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
121 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500                        Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  













































Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF SINO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC COMPETITION ON 
SOUTHEAST ASIA’S POST-COLD WAR REGIONAL ORDER 
 
Sidharto R. Suryodipuro 
Civilian, Foreign Service of Indonesia 
B.A., Universitas Parahyangan, 1991 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
 
from the  
 




















James J. Wirtz 





















































 Southeast Asia is a maritime crossroad and an arena of strategic great power 
interaction. The study of international politics after the Cold War has rediscovered the 
importance of regional interaction as the framework for understanding countries’ security 
strategies and the great powers’ impact on specific regions. A review of various theories, 
furthermore, reveals the revival of geopolitics in theoretical constructions and policy 
formulations. 
 This thesis reviews United States-China relations as the independent variable. The 
U.S. grand strategy has been consistent since the first Bush administration, namely to 
prevent the rise of a peer competitor. The American instruments in pursuit of its strategy 
are derived from its nature as a maritime power. China is a continental power that is 
recently expanding seaward and reemerging as East Asia’s indispensable power. China’s 
success in promoting its vision of order in maritime Southeast Asia will potentially 
undermine America’s influence. 
 Southeast Asia’s regional order, the dependent variable, is dynamic when viewed 
from its two dimensions: time and space. Time refers to historical cycles, while space 
refers to the diverse views in dealing with the major powers, i.e., regional autonomy, a 
balance of engagement among the great powers and, since the 1990s, stronger 
engagement only with Northeast Asia. This thesis argues that regional identity is the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND: SOUTHEAST ASIA AS A GREAT POWERS’ 
ARENA 
 Nineteen-ninety seven was a watershed year for Southeast Asia. Three 
developments underline the importance of that year. First, all the region’s countries were 
finally consolidating under the embrace of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). Vietnam joined in 1995, and Laos and Myanmar joined in 1997. Cambodia 
also was set to join in 1997 until internal power struggles postponed it to 1999. One of 
the consequences of membership expansion was ASEAN’s diversification between 
pluralized and centralized economic and political systems and between maritime and 
continental polities. Nonetheless, optimism reigned. The foreign minister of Indonesia, 
Ali Alatas, predicted that an ASEAN of all Southeast Asian countries would “increase 
our ability to deal with … problems now that we are together.”1 
 Second, a series of crises engulfed the region. These started with the collapse of 
the Thai and Indonesian currencies that led to the Asian financial crisis. Thereafter came 
the fall of President Suharto of Indonesia, the region’s longest serving leader, followed 
by a protracted political crisis in that country and by the East Timor debacle that 
weakened the organization’s security role. In addition, wide spread forest fires occurred 
in Indonesia, covering the western part of the country and the Malay peninsula with 
smoke. These fires were an important consideration in the dilution of the region’s non-
interference principle. The APSO (Asia Pacific Security Outlook) project also considered 
1997 as “an important turning point.” It argued that the economic crisis “played a critical 
role in creating the new and more sober political and economic assessment of the region,” 
shook public confidence in regional governments, and “weakened the region’s economic 
cooperation institutions” while restoring interest in bilateral economic and political 
cooperation.2 
                     1 Acharya, Amitav, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia, p. 136. Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
2 Morrison, Charles E. (ed.), Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2003, pp. 9-10. An APAP Project. Japan 
Center for International Exchange, 2003. 
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 Finally, in 1997, for the first time the leaders of Southeast and Northeast Asia met 
in the context of the annual ASEAN summit, initiating a process that would expand the 
scope of cooperation among the ASEAN countries and China, Japan, and the Republic of 
Korea. Of the three, the ASEAN-China relationship has expanded the most rapidly. This 
is a dramatic development, considering that only in the first half of the 1990s Brunei, 
Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam established or renormalized diplomatic relations with 
China. The New York Times correctly observed that Myanmar’s inclusion in ASEAN in 
1997 was part of the region’s efforts to strengthen regional solidarity, which “in the face 
of China’s growing economic and political influence is emerging as a unifying theme, 
replacing the anti-Communism that motivated Asean’s [sic] founders and energized its 
policies in the 1970’s and 80’s.”3 President Jiang Zemin came to the summit with offers 
of help by promising that China would not devalue its currency to prevent cascading 
devaluations and to absorb more imports from Southeast Asian economies. China and 
Southeast Asia agreed “to heighten cooperation … in promoting economic growth, 
sustainable development and social progress” and “to resolve their differences or disputes 
through peaceful means … [including] to resolve their disputes in the South China Sea 
through friendly consultations and negotiations … [and] not to allow existing differences 
to hamper the development of friendly relations and cooperation.”4 This meeting laid the 
foundation for closer China-Southeast Asia relations. 
 Throughout its modern history, Southeast Asia has always been an interest of the 
major powers because of its geography and natural resources and more recently because 
of its growing purchasing power and rising Islamic influence. Therefore, a closer China-
Southeast Asia relationship is not exceptional as such since they are closely located and 
have the potential for mutual gain. China is building closer relations with its immediate 
neighbors in the Mekong region through various infrastructural projects, such as the 
Singapore-Kunming railway, the Kunming-Bangkok highway, and the dredging of the 
Mekong River for navigation and trade. Beijing is also seeking closer relations with 
Southeast Asia’s maritime region. The strategic significance of China-Southeast Asia 
                     3 Mydans, Seth, “Asian Bloc’s Anniversary Celebration Becomes a Plea for Outside Help,” New York 
Times, 17 December 1997. 
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4 Joint Statement of the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and 
the President of the People’s Republic of China, Kuala Lumpur, 16 December 1997. 
relations, therefore, lies in relation to the United States.  This is the case because China is 
a major power that is rising much faster than ever anticipated and because the United 
States as the sole superpower is attempting to prevent the rise of a peer competitor, both  
globally and regionally. 
 Southeast Asia’s systematic search for regional order began in the 1960s, 
emerging in the insular/peninsular sub-region, represented by the establishment of 
ASEAN in 1967, and in the Mekong sub-region dominated by Vietnam. Two Mekong 
countries avoided Vietnam’s hegemony: Thailand that joined ASEAN and Myanmar that 
opted for isolation. Both sub-regions were concerned about the impact of the great 
powers, but they chose differing venues. ASEAN is the more relevant because its 
incorporation of the Mekong countries a few years ago vindicates its regional order 
concept. Its concept of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) sought to free 
the region “from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers.” However, no 
absolute agreement existed within ASEAN on what constituted “interference.” Some 
countries opted for more autonomy, while others opted for more engagement with the 
great powers. Moreover, geography continues to play a divisive role at present because 
ASEAN with its ten members is clearly divided between the continental sub-region 
(Mekong) and the insular/peninsular sub-region, where the former is closer physically to 
China while the latter is more in tune with American maritime power. 
 How does Sino-American strategic competition affect Southeast Asia’s post-Cold 
War regional order? To grasp this matter, this thesis addresses three sets of issues. The 
first is the historical relationship between the evolution of regional order and great power 
interaction. The second is the nature of Chinese and American interaction, their grand 
strategy, and their interests and capabilities in the region. The third issue is the regional 
countries’ perception of Sino-American interaction and the adequacy of ZOPFAN. The 
period of this research begins in the early 1990s and extrapolates into the next ten years. 
The research methodology relies on assessment of historical trends and comparative 
concepts of security and draws from primary and secondary resources. 
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B. GREAT POWER INTERACTION AND REGIONAL ORDER 
1. Conceptual Discourse 
 Security is a central concept in this thesis, which presumes the existence of an 
anarchic system of nation-states. A number of observers have argued that since the end of 
the Cold War, the scope of great power interaction has shifted from the global to the 
regional level: e.g., Lake and Morgan, 1997. Barry Buzan offers a framework that 
emphasizes the importance of regional political systems that are differentiable from the 
global system (as during the Cold War). He argues that the principal element in regional 
security is a pattern of amity and enmity; the former refers to “relationships ranging from 
genuine friendships to expectations of protection or support,” while the latter is 
“relationships set by suspicion and fear.”5  
 David Lake and Patrick Morgan define regional order as a mode of conflict 
management shaped by factors such as “the regional system structure, the domestic 
politics of states in the region, and the interaction between the region and the global 
system.”6 In their construct, regional orders range from traditional arrangements, such as 
balance of power, to cooperative security management that includes “a great power 
concert, collective security, a pluralistic security community, or a modest level of 
integration.”7 Regional countries, they argue, have certain preferences, perceptions, and 
strategies on how to develop the order; however, the questions are how and why these 
states opt for a particular approach. Furthermore, Patrick Morgan contends that the higher 
the level of security order, “the less vulnerable it should be to external penetration, 
because it has fewer conflicts that invite intervention.”8 
                     5 Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear (2nd Ed.): An Agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era, pp.190. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991. 
6 Lake, David A. and Morgan, Patrick M., “The New Regionalism in Security Affairs,” in David A. 
Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (ed.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, p. 9. Pennsylvania 
University Press, 1997, A Project of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and 
Cooperation. 
7 Lake and Morgan, p. 12. 
8 Patrick M. Morgan, “Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders,” in Lake and Morgan 
(ed.), p. 39. 
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 Muthiah Alagappa considers order as a “purposive arrangement” that governs 
interaction among states “in their pursuit of individual and collective goals.” 
Furthermore, rule-governed interaction 
makes for a predictable and stable environment in which states can coexist and 
collaborate in the pursuit of their national, regional, and global goals, differences 
and disputes can be adjusted in a peaceful manner, and change can occur without 
resort to violence. … Order is … a matter of degree. … [T]he key criterion of 
order is whether interstate interactions conform to accepted rules, not whether 
they sustain particular goals.9 
 Alagappa proposes three competing visions and strategies for Asia’s regional 
order: “hegemony with liberal features, strategic condominium/balance of power, and 
institutionalism.”10 The first one, hegemony with liberal features, is primarily reflected by 
the United States, whose “vision for the Asian region is a derivative of its global vision,” 
considers the region vital to its economic and security interests and “seeks to expand the 
international order rooted in Western values to make it a truly global order under its 
leadership.”11 The second vision and strategy of order is espoused primarily by China, 
which “emphasizes order among sovereign states” and stresses that “the goal of 
international order should be to protect state sovereignty and territorial integrity, prevent 
external interference in domestic affairs, and promote national prosperity and strength.”12 
China also argues that a multipolar world is more stable and peaceful than a unipolar one; 
China is willing to cooperate with the United States in the management of regional 
security, but if that were not possible, it would seek to balance the United States through 
multipolarity and coalition. The final vision—institutionalism—is espoused by ASEAN 
in ways that, similar to the Chinese conception, seeks sovereignty, equality of states and 
non-interference. However, it differs in the means to establish an order, whether through 
power or norms.13 
                     9 Alagappa, Muthiah, “The Study of International Order: An Analytical Framework,” in Alagappa, 
Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, p. 39. Stanford University Press, 2003. 
10 Alagappa, Muthiah, “Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conceptions and Issues,” in Alagappa, 
Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, p. 72. Stanford University Press, 2003. 
11 Alagappa, pp. 73-74. 
12 Alagappa, 76. 
13 Alagappa, 76-77. 
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 One form of order that is relevant in the context of Southeast Asia, and ASEAN in 
particular, is “security community.” This is also relevant because that regional 
association chose to transform security community from practice to policy.14 This 
concept was developed by Karl W. Deutsch in his writings in the 1960s, which in turn 
was based on the study of problems of international organization in the early 1950s. A 
relevant sub-division is “pluralistic security community” to describe a group of nation 
states, usually within a confined geographic scope, that preserves “peace among the 
integrated political unit.”15 The way to determine the existence of a security community 
is to test “the subjective opinions of the political decision-makers, or the politically 
relevant social strata, in each country” and “with measurement of tangible commitments, 
and of resource allocations people make to back them up.”16 
 Amitav Acharya looks at the development of Southeast Asia as a security 
community. According to him, this concept provides “a framework within which to 
examine the evolution and nature of ASEAN’s political and security role and identify the 
constraints it faces in developing a viable regional security community.”17 Furthermore, 
he contends that Southeast Asia’s post-Cold War relations with the major powers were 
transformed “from the norm of regional autonomy expressed through ZOPFAN, which 
had sought to exclude the great powers from involvement in the management of regional 
order” to an inclusive approach that kept the great powers engaged.18 By implication, he 
extrapolates a transformation of regional order from one form of autonomy to another. 
Similarly, Yuen Foong Khong also sees Southeast Asia forming a pluralistic security 
community, “albeit a nascent one.”19 
                     14 The 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia, adopted the security community concept “to bring 
ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane.” Part A paragraph 1 of Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord II. 
15 Deutsch, Karl W., The Analysis of International Relations, p. 193. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968. 
16 Deutsch, Karl W., Tides Among Nations, p. 181. The Free Press, 1979. 
17 Acharya, Amitav, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem 
of regional order, p. 6. Routledge, 2001. 
18 Acharya, Security Community, pp. 195, 200-1. 
19 Yuen Foon Khong, “ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex,” in Lake and Morgan 
(ed.), p. 320. 
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 Acharya also argues, “Southeast Asia’s international relations represent a quest 
for regional identity.”20 For him, identity is the result of greater homogeneity and 
commonality, achieved through “a diffusion of norms, policies and practices of regional 
organizations and associations,” and is important to strengthen member countries’ 
commitment “to present a unified front vis-a-vis the outside world.”21 
 Benjamin Miller and Korina Kagan established a conceptual relationship between 
great power relations and regional conflicts. Their theory was constructed based on their 
study of the Balkans during the post-Napoleonic period until the post-Cold War era. 
Their thesis argues that, “variations in the degree of intensity of conflicts and the 
likelihood of successful conflict resolution in different regions are affected by the 
character of great power involvement in these regions.”22 They maintain that great 
powers will compete in a given region to prevent the rise of any one of them as the 
region’s hegemon that could threaten their important interests.”23 In this framework, 
capabilities and interests determine the great powers’ policies. Capabilities refer to 
overall capacity (i.e., military, economic, sociopolitical cohesiveness), including power-
projection capabilities; whereas interests refer to the various stakes a great power has in a 
region, such as security, economic and political, and its relations with other great powers. 
Relations among the great powers, furthermore, are shaped by their position as status quo 
or revisionist states and their ideological similarity and polarity.24 Their conceptual 
framework is applicable to Southeast Asia. 
 Robert S. Ross links U.S.-China relations to East Asia’s geographic nature, 
arguing that “geography contributes to regional stability and order because it shapes the a 
priori causes of conflict: capabilities, interests, and the security dilemma.”25 In East Asia 
and the Pacific, the great power structure takes the form of bipolarity, namely between a 
                     20 Acharya, The Quest for Identity, p. 11. 
21 Acharya, The Quest for Identity, p. 10-11. 
22 Miller, Benjamin and Kagan, Korina, “The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe 
and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era,” International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 41, Issue 1 (Mar., 1997), p. 51. 
23 Miller and Kagan, p. 58. 
24 Miller and Kagan, pp. 61-64. 
25 Ross, Robert S., “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” 
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), p. 117. 
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continental-dominant China and a maritime-dominant United States.26 Their differing 
geographic nature and power projection capabilities have enforced a stable regional 
order, though national policies and ambitions could be destabilizing. 
 Most observers agree on the importance of geographic proximity. As Buzan 
contends, “The political structure of anarchy confronts all states with the security 
dilemma, but the otherwise seamless web of security interdependence is powerfully 
mediated by the effects of geography.”27 Furthermore, “threats operate more potently 
over short distances” and, therefore, security relations with neighbors tend to be more 
important.28 Miller and Kagan argue that geographic proximity defines great powers’ 
capabilities and interests. Morgan also takes into account geographic propinquity, 
although it does not appear in his conclusion. Southeast Asia’s distinct characteristic is, 
as Robert Ross asserts, the geographic division between the continental Mekong sub-
region that is in China’s immediate neighborhood and the insular/peninsular sub-region 
that is in the post-Second World War period became America’s sphere of influence. 
Morgan’s contribution is his recognition that regional countries do not merely react and 
adjust to the great powers, as indicated in the Miller and Kagan framework, but as part of 
the security complex they could initiate action and call the attention of the great powers 
to their security concerns.  
 Other observers who look at regional order from the point of view of intra-
regional politics do not agree. Leong H. Goh argues that “primordial fears and the quest 
for national prestige and power will continue to dictate the evolution of the geopolitics of 
Southeast Asia well into the foreseeable future … [which is] in stark contrast to the 
expected attitudes and behavior of political elites and masses within a tightly coupled 
security community.” 29 N. Ganesan gives a more pointed argument, asserting that 
“bilateral tensions within the geostrategic core of ASEAN disprove the hypothesis that 
ASEAN constitutes a security community.”30 
                     26 Ross, p. 84-6. 
27 Buzan, p. 191. 
28 Buzan, p. 191. 
29 Goh, Leong H., “The Chimera of the ASEAN Regional Security Community,” Thesis (Monterey: 
NPS, 1999), p. 107. 
  8 
30 Ganesan, N., Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, p. 56. Institute of Southeast Asian 
2. Hypothesis 
 The hypothesis here is that Southeast Asia’s order will increasingly be influenced 
by China’s rise, but the region as an aggregate will preserve, if not seek to strengthen, its 
relations with the United States to maintain its autonomy. In other words, the region will 
engage a China that has come out of its isolation and has since continued to strengthen its 
place in East Asia. In the meantime, the regional order based on ZOPFAN will need to be 
reviewed and adjusted in light of the Sino-American competition and the potential of 
dividing ASEAN along geographic lines. This hypothesis rests on the following 
assumptions. First, the United States will remain a Western Pacific power and 
Washington will continue to regard East Asia as an area of strategic interest. Second, in 
this period China will not face a crisis of a magnitude that will compel it to reduce its 
international involvement, as it had before the mid-1970s. Third, the Taiwan issue will 
not spin out of control and lead to war involving the United States. Finally, in the absence 
of a peer competitor, partisan politics in Washington take precedence over the need to 
maintain close relations with other countries. Southeast Asia’s role could be relevant if 
the regional order it develops helps to alleviate the negative impact of Sino-American 
strategic competition. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS 
 Chapter II reviews the evolution of Southeast Asia’s regional order between 1967, 
when ASEAN was founded, and 1978, when Vietnam invaded and occupied Cambodia. 
Great power politics were characterized by a U.S. presence in mainland Southeast Asia 
and by Soviet and Chinese efforts to force it out, followed by Sino-American 
rapprochement. The second period, 1978 to 1992, saw relaxation and then heightened 
tension among the great powers, particularly the realignment of China and the United 
States and their opposition to Soviet hegemonism. The result for Southeast Asia was the 
further polarization of the insular/peninsular and continental sub-regions. 
 Chapter III looks at the grand strategy of China and the United States since the 
end of the Cold War and their competing interests and capabilities in East Asia. The 
focus is the intensifying coexistence of the two powers in the region, leading to 
                     
Studies, 1999. 
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competing orders and military presence, as well as their respective trading relations with 
Southeast Asia. 
 Chapter IV analyzes the evolution of Southeast Asia’s order in light of ASEAN 
members’ inward and outward orientations. It argues that the expansion of ASEAN to 
China’s borders has potentially weakened the organization’s cohesiveness, while the 
1997 financial crisis has encouraged closer relations with Northeast Asia, in particular 
China. The fissuring of ASEAN’s outlook orientation and weakening position vis-à-vis 
China necessitated stronger regional integration and identity. 
 Chapter V concludes the thesis by linking the research question and the findings. 
It then attempts to explore the implications of Sino-American strategic competition for 
Southeast Asia’s regional order. The chapter offers suggestions on how all parties may 
strengthen the region’s role as a buffer and catalyst for a stable Sino-American 
relationship in Southeast Asia. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF SOUTHEAST 
ASIA’S COLD WAR REGIONAL ORDER 
 The development of Southeast Asia’s “region-ness” or regional identity and 
coherence over the past three decades owes much to the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). Before the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, little agreement or 
common perception existed on what constituted “Southeast Asia.” The term entered the 
international relations lexicon during the Second World War when the British named its 
regional military command covering Ceylon, Sumatra, Malaya, Thailand, Burma, and 
Indochina as the South-East Asia Command (SEAC).31 In the 1950s, the region was 
lumped together with the Far East, as reflected in the House of Representatives’ Sub-
committee on Southeast Asia, the Far East and the Pacific. The Chinese call the region 
the Nanyang or South Seas, reflecting the millennium-long relations based on primarily 
maritime trade and migration. 
 The region’s historical variation and different colonial powers created nation-
states with differing statehood processes, senses of nationalism and national purpose. 
Another diverging factor was the region’s geographic division into the sub-continent 
(Mekong, consisting of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam), the peninsula 
(Thailand, Malaysia and, for practical purposes, Singapore), and the archipelago (Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore). Finally, part of the region neighbors 
China, which makes it highly susceptible to great power competition. The region bore the 
brunt of the American strategy of containment and Chinese proxy wars during the three 
Indochina Wars. The insular and peninsular sub-regions grew close to the United States, 
which was viewed more sympathetically than China, Japan, and the Soviet Union. The 
United States’ ties with Australia reinforced those ties. The United States actively courted 
non-communist Southeast Asian countries and supported their development of capitalism 
                     31 Acharya, Amitav, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia, p. 34. Oxford 
University Press, 2000. From a purely geographical perspective, the region was identified much earlier, 
e.g., J. Scott Keltie in “Some Geographical Problems,” Geographical Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, September 
1897, p. 313 [in JSTOR], talked about “the Malay peninsula and … the great array of islands in the east and 
south-east of Asia—Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines” as geographical blanks to be explored. 
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and even authoritarianism.32 The peninsular and insular countries’ trading traditions 
conformed to America’s capitalism and international trade regime, as did their 
geographic relevance to America’s maritime power. 
 The first regional organization was the South-East Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), initiated by the United States and Great Britain and established in Manila in 
1954. Established as a reaction to developments in Indochina, the organization did not 
address the problem of insurgencies, which was the key security problem for most 
Southeast Asians, including those not in SEATO (Indonesia and Malaysia). As a foreign 
initiated organization, SEATO was likely to aggravate rather than alleviate internal 
security problems because external security support tended to weaken the government’s 
legitimacy.33 The United States on its part gradually shifted its position into supporting 
indigenous organizations, particularly after the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine in the 
late 1960s. In 1961, Malaya, Thailand, and the Philippines established the Association of 
Southeast Asia (ASA) with the primary objectives of fighting communist insurgencies 
through closer economic cooperation and of developing regional self-reliance. In 1963, 
Maphilindo was established and consisted, as its name implies, of Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia. Both the ASA and Maphilindo did not last long, primarily 
because of the problems surrounding the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia in 
1964, which Indonesia and the Philippines opposed.34 The establishment of ASEAN in 
1967 confirmed Malaysia’s status and territory even though the Philippines still contested 
Sabah’s ownership.  
A. THE PERIOD 1967-1978 
 Despite the failure of ASA and Maphilindo, they established some of the 
principles that would later guide ASEAN’s work. These include ASA’s design as an 
inclusive grouping, minimal administrative machinery, and greater regional self-reliance, 
as well as Maphilindo’s regional-solution-to-regional-problem approach, restraint on 
                     32 Chia Lin Sien and Martin Perry, “Introduction,” in Chia Lin Sien, Southeast Asia Transformed: A 
Geography of Change, p. 2. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003. 
33 Acharya, The Quest for Identity, pp. 68. 
34 Acharya, The Quest for Identity, pp. 78-83. 
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foreign military bases on their soil from subverting other members’ independence, and 
adoption of musyawarah (consultation-consensus) as the basis of decision making.35 
 The strategic design of ASEAN is contained in its founding declaration of 1967, 
which expressed the member states’ determination to “ensure their stability and security 
from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national 
identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples.” The declaration 
regarded foreign military bases as temporary, that is to “remain only with the expressed 
concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or 
indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of states in the area or 
prejudice the orderly procedures of their national development.” However, the 
declaration’s operative paragraphs that defined ASEAN’s actual operation avoided 
strategic and political issues, focusing instead on cooperation in the fields of economics, 
social, cultural, legal, educational, agricultural, and regional studies. As one scholar put 
it, ASEAN was “a diplomatic community, if of a limited kind”36 Nonetheless, a 
stipulation in the declaration that the organization be open for participation to all 
Southeast Asian states would be instrumental in incorporating the Mekong countries in 
the 1990s. 
 In its first few years, ASEAN did not play any significant political and strategic 
role in regional stability since it was not in a position to mitigate the threat from China 
(for Indonesia and Malaysia) or Vietnam (for Thailand). Additionally, it did not have the 
clout and capacity to help settle the Second Indochina War. The communist bloc was 
suspicious of this new body, but Washington and its allies were favorable because 
ASEAN was favorable to their ideological and strategic position. While ASEAN’s 
security role was limited, it did provide a forum for the foreign ministers of its members 
to meet regularly and to manage and prevent their disputes from becoming open conflicts. 
Moreover, ASEAN signified the realization that regional countries had a role to play in 
their destiny. 
 
                     35 Acharya, pp. 81-83. 
36 Leifer, Michael, “The Role and Paradox of ASEAN,” in Michael Leifer (ed.), The Balance of Power 
in East Asia, p. 119. St. Martin’s Press, 1986. 
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1. ZOPFAN: Background and Constituents 
 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was established during one of the 
greatest tensions in the region, at the height of the Vietnam War. The United States 
perceived this war as “the decisive battle that would determine whether guerilla war 
could be stopped and the Cold War won,”37 leading to the deployment of around half a 
million troops in Vietnam between 1967 and 1970.38 The United States also had interests 
in economic relations and natural resources in the region.39 China looked at the war as an 
American effort to expand its military on China’s periphery and to bring down the 
Chinese revolution and the communist regime. Beijing was simultaneously facing an 
increasingly threatening Soviet Union that had built up forces along its border and 
appeared posed to attack, particularly against China’s nascent nuclear weapons program. 
Being a backward continental power and quite aware of its weak defenses against the 
American navy and air force, China threatened large-scale infantry attacks against Laos 
and Thailand to start a ground war with the United States which succeeded in deterring 
an actual war.40 Large numbers of the People’s Liberation Army personnel served in 
North Vietnam, to assist the Vietnamese as well as to serve as a warning to the United 
States of China’s seriousness.  
 The Soviet Union was increasingly worried about China’s recklessness, especially 
after it exploded its first atom bomb in 1964, and its growing influence in Southeast Asia 
through Vietnam. Moscow’s reach in Southeast Asia, however, was limited because it 
had neither America’s maritime projection capability nor China’s geographical 
proximity; therefore, the Vietnam War presented opportunities for its regional standing. 
By supporting Vietnam, Moscow hoped to draw it away from China’s gravity, at the 
same time demonstrating its role as the leader of the communist bloc. It also gave the 
                     37 Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy, pp. 644-45. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. 
38 Herring, George C., America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, p. 182. 
McGraw Hill, 2002. 
39 Tin, natural rubber and oil, among other things, have been highlighted in various U.S. government 
documents spanning almost three decades; e.g., A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary 
of State on U.S Policy Towards Southeast Asia, (NSC 51, Washington, 1 July 1949) and US Policy 
Interests in the Asian-Pacific Area, (A Study by Ambassador William R. Kintner, Department of State, 31 
October 1975). 
40 Garver, John W., Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, 258, 297. Prentice-Hall, 
1993. 
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Soviets an opportunity to test weapon systems under battle conditions. By early 1968, the 
Soviets had provided military assistance, including fighter planes, surface-to-air missiles 
(SAMs), and tanks, to the tune of 1.8 billion rubles. Three thousand Soviet technicians 
took direct part in the war.41 
 The members of ASEAN generally perceived China as a threat and welcomed 
U.S. presence, but recognized the potential danger of Sino-American hostilities and 
Soviet-American competition to the region’s stability and identity. On 27 November 
1971, the foreign ministers of the ASEAN countries (Thailand was represented by a 
special envoy) met in Kuala Lumpur and declared their determination “to exert initially 
necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone 
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by 
outside Powers.” [Italics added.] This stipulation was directed against external 
interference, but a second one (the declaration contained only two operative paragraphs) 
was directed internally to strengthen inter-state relations. It states, “Southeast Asian 
countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation which would 
contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.” Intra-regional affairs were 
considered key to preventing external interference, and member states’ “national 
resilience” was key to “regional resilience;” that is, national stability provides the basis 
for efforts toward the peaceful settlement of disputes among regional states and the 
promotion of regional stability and security.42 
 The idea of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) began as 
Malaysia’s initiative aiming to create regional neutrality. The prime minister of Malaysia, 
speaking before the non-aligned summit in 1971, proposed that Southeast Asia be 
neutralized under the guarantee of China, the United States, and the Soviet Union as 
Asia’s three principal powers. The proposal itself was not a novel idea. Some countries, 
such as Burma, Laos, and Cambodia, were already seeking neutrality at the national 
level. At the regional level, the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations in 1966 
had already conducted a study and issued a report entitled Neutralization in Southeast 
                     41 Herring, 176-77. 
42 Acharya, Amitav, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia (Singapore: 
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Asia: Problems and Prospects. Malaysia itself conducted internal discussions in 1968 
anticipating British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore.43 
 However, three interrelated issues inhibited regional neutrality. First, some 
countries had problems with neutrality. Indonesia was not ready to give policing rights to 
external powers, Singapore was not prepared to embrace strict neutrality because of its 
reliance on an outside security guarantee, and the Philippines had not seriously 
contemplated closure of American bases on its soil. Second, China, the United States, and 
the Soviet Union would have to respect and guarantee the status and integrity of the 
region’s neutrality; nevertheless, none of them was prepared to forego their rights in the 
region, particularly the strategic waterways. They also had some kind of security 
relationship with one or more regional countries. Third, agreeing on the meaning of 
“interference” was difficult.44 Nonetheless, neutrality was attractive because of national 
precedence. 
 The other element of ZOPFAN is the “zone of peace” (ZOP) concept. Different 
from neutrality, which presumes the agreement of and political arrangements with 
external powers, ZOP is more of a legal and normative concept that does not necessarily 
need external endorsement at the initial stage. The idea of ZOP originated in proposals 
for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) in various regions, endorsed by the non-
aligned summit in Cairo in 1964. The non-aligned summit in Lusaka in 1970 endorsed 
the idea of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (IOZP), which was subsequently adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly as the “Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a 
Zone of Peace.”45 The declaration called upon the great powers to consult with littoral 
states, to halt the escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean, 
and to eliminate their military bases and other installations. The region’s dominant 
maritime powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain) disregarded the  
                     43 Subedi, Surya P., Land and Maritime Zones of Peace in International Law, p. 107. Oxford 
University Press, 1996. 
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declaration through citing rights granted by the UN Charter for self-defense and 
collective security, as well as by international law regarding freedom of navigation and 
overflight of international waters.46 
 The third element of ZOPFAN is “freedom.” Unlike the earlier elements that have 
legal-normative precedents in international relations, this element should be understood 
in the context of historical experiences, particularly colonialism and external interference 
in domestic political affairs. This element was also the result of Indonesia’s distrust of 
external powers, including China, the Soviet Union, and the West. Therefore, ASEAN 
established a Committee of Officials on Neutralization, which in its meetings in May and 
July 1972 stressed non-interference, sovereignty, and mutual benefit as key concepts to 
freedom. The committee formulated the definition of freedom as 
the freedom of States from control, domination, or interference by other States in 
the conduct of their national and external affairs. This means the right of zonal 
States to solve their domestic problems in terms of their own conditions and 
aspirations, to assume primary responsibility for the security and well-being of 
the region and their regional and international relations on the basis of sovereign 
equality and mutual benefit.47 
 In practice, no agreement existed on how to achieve freedom. Indonesia and 
Malaysia considered freedom in the context of regional autonomy. The Indonesian 
president, Suharto, described his country’s vision in 1973: “What we want is the birth of 
a new Southeast Asia that can stand on its own feet and not let its future be decided by 
outside powers. Such a Southeast Asia, where there is no conflict, no suspicious feeling, 
and no foreign intervention, would be able to make a positive contribution to world 
peace.”48 This is the idealist’s “inward” view of regional freedom, which stood in 
contrast to the realist’s “outward” version. The latter’s main proponent, Singapore, which 
initially opposed establishing ASEAN because of its perception of primary threat from 
within the region (Indonesia and Malaysia) rather than from the great powers, preferred 
to have all the great powers present in the region. In 1974, Singapore’s prime minister, 
Lee Kuan Yew, remarked that it was necessary 
                     46 Subedi, pp. 1-14 
47 Quoted in Wilson, p. 31, and Subedi,  p. 111. 
48 Quoted in Wilson, p. 56. 
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to strike a balance between the growing Soviet capacity, Japan’s interest in free 
passage through Southeast Asian waters and open trade with the region, the 
legitimate interests of China, and the continuing global interest of the United 
States in ensuring that “no major or super power exerts an overwhelming 
pressure on any single important part of the world, and that includes Southeast 
Asia.”49 
For Singapore, a combination of capable indigenous defense forces and friendly alliances 
with many countries having a stake in its security, prosperity, and integrity is the best 
guarantee for national and regional security.50 For example, even though it was clearly in 
the Western camp, from November 1971 Singapore provided services and repairs for 
Soviet fishing and naval auxiliary vessels. 51 This sets the pattern for Southeast Asia’s 
regional order, which would oscillate or combine the idealism of excluding the great 
powers and the pragmatism of engaging all of them. Apparently, however, both 
approaches work best in tandem. 
 The United States supported ASEAN’s establishment. Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk commented, 
this new organization might be the first of its kind; a regional alliance in 
American interests but without the need for American intervention. As such, it 
would be much better than a follow-on to SEATO ... ASEAN would be a force 
for stability on its own that even the communist countries of Asia might want to 
join and that would be a better guarantee against future wars than continuing to 
have to fight them.52 
Nonetheless, Washington was not enthusiastic about ASEAN’s neutralist tendency and 
was instrumental in toning it down. American officials and experts argued that Southeast 
Asia’s neutrality would create momentum for the neo-isolationists in Washington and 
that it ran counter to America’s interest as the leading maritime nation in and the 
economic partner of the region.53 The Soviet Union accepted Southeast Asia’s neutrality 
on condition of agreement by the other powers to create a level playing field that would 
                     49 Quoted in Wilson, pp. 83-84. 
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strengthen the Soviet position. In any case, Moscow had to ensure that Southeast Asian 
waters remained open for Soviet shipping between the two ends of its Eurasian 
landmass.54 China was more receptive to ZOPFAN because it had the least use for the 
sea-lanes of communication and it was interested in the removal of American bases from 
the region and the obstruction of Soviet advances. Furthermore, ZOPFAN would serve as 
Beijing’s buffer against the other great powers. In 1973, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
observed , “[t]he only power that has responded [affirmatively] is China, but it is not yet 
in a position to guarantee it,” and concluded, Southeast Asians “have to guess what 
China’s willingness to guarantee neutrality will be when it has a blue water fleet that can 
police the straits of Southeast Asia, the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.”55 
 Legally and politically, ZOPFAN was significant as well. ZOPFAN was “a 
radical step in the annals of international law and practice” 56 and it provided the legal and 
normative basis or code of conduct for managing intra-regional affairs. At its first summit 
in Bali in 1976, ASEAN adopted the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
(TAC), which contains two main elements for the conduct of regional politics. The first is 
the principles for regional cooperation, such as mutual respect for the independence, 
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity; non-interference; peaceful 
settlement of disputes; and, non-use or threat of force. The second element is the High 
Council, a mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes comprising representatives at 
the ministerial level from each state. The treaty was open for accession by all Southeast 
Asian states, not just ASEAN members. 
 The political significance of ZOPFAN lies in the agreement to develop a regional 
order and identity, even though the ASEAN countries differed on the method of 
achieving it due to differing security concerns. Nevertheless, ZOPFAN was a way to 
strike a new regional balance to mitigate the withdrawal of the United States from 
Indochina and Thailand and the United Kingdom from Malaysia and Singapore, as well 
as the possibility of China and the Soviet Union filling the vacuum. Additionally, 
ZOPFAN implied a commitment to peaceful relations among the ASEAN states, 
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including peaceful resolution of differences and disputes. Territorial disputes, for 
example, remained a big problem because many boundaries had not yet been delineated 
by the colonial powers. In the case where boundaries had been determined , the newly 
independent states did not agree to  them.57 Maritime boundaries had been the most 
difficult not only because of the Southeast Asian governments’ decision to postpone 
territorial negotiations for various reasons, but also because they had to wait for the 
promulgation of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea in 1984 as the basis for 
settlement. 
2. Vietnam and the Sino-American-Soviet Triangle 
 Vietnam and Indochina’s security is directly tied to China as its largest and over-
bearing neighbor and Hanoi’s relations with other major powers, such as the Soviet 
Union, were important to balance China. Hanoi was acutely aware that even during times 
of close relations, China was willing to sacrifice Vietnam’s interests for the sake of its 
own. One of Vietnam’s early experiences was the 1954 Geneva Conference, which saw 
China’s support for Vietnam’s partition. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was reported to 
have said to the French delegation in Geneva, 
Indochina should be cut into four zones. Ho [Chi Minh] will be allowed to keep 
North Vietnam, of course. But Laos and Cambodia should stay independent … 
and continue as members of French Overseas Union. The South of Vietnam 
should be partitioned off. A separate government could be formed there. We 
could talk of eventual unification by elections … but China would not mind if 
this unification did not actually occur. 58 
Hanoi rejected the division, and in December 1960, it established the National Liberation 
Front of South Vietnam to reunify Vietnam. China again supported Hanoi’s drive, which 
represented a fundamental shift from its position before 1960 of not supporting 
Vietnam’s unification.59 Premier Zhou Enlai perceived the overall U.S. strategy as triple 
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encirclement of China, which failed in Korea but remained in Taiwan and now in 
Vietnam.60 China provided both men and materiel to support Vietnam’s objectives in this 
Second Indochina War against the United States. According to John Garver, by 1966 
China had deployed around 50,000 of its troops to North Vietnam to man anti-aircraft 
guns, carry out logistic work, and repair rail lines destroyed by U.S. bombing. Moreover, 
“[b]etween October 1965 and October 1968 (when PLA forces were withdrawn), a total 
of 320,000 Chinese troops served in North Vietnam, with the annual maximum reaching 
170,000.” 61 Vietnam was taking advantage of both China and the Soviet Union in its war 
efforts. However, the 1972 Sino-American rapprochement changed Hanoi’s calculations. 
 Shortly after President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, according to his 
National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, “Sino-American relations had moved from 
strident hostility and isolation to de facto alliance against the pre-eminent [Soviet] 
threat.”62 Beijing was induced by the border clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969 and 
by America’s decreasing threat in Southeast Asia, as well as a need to preempt possible 
U.S.-Soviet détente and their collusion against China.63 Rapprochement enabled Beijing 
to shake off its diplomatic isolation, including establishing relations with Japan in 1972 
and a number of ASEAN members—Malaysia in 1974, and the Philippines and Thailand 
in 1975. This process was preceded by Beijing’s United Nations representation, replacing 
Taiwan in 1971.  
 The United States also gained respite from its Cold War struggle with the Soviet 
Union, reflected in the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in May 1972, followed by the conclusion 
of the nuclear limitations agreement and again by summits in 1973 and 1974. During this 
period, however, the Soviet Union intensified its naval presence in the region and 
established a closer relationship with the Indochina countries. In 1969, Moscow proposed 
a collective security system in Asia, known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, but it did not 
receive the support of ASEAN countries.  These countries were concerned  about giving 
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Moscow a security role that would ran counter to ASEAN’s regional design “to 
strengthen regional independence and avoid having this area become a regional 
cockpit”64 and, at the same time, possibly offend the Chinese against whom the doctrine 
was aimed.65 In place of the unsuccessful doctrine, the Soviets concluded bilateral 
friendship treaties with Laos (1977), Cambodia and Vietnam (both in 1978), and 
provided military aid and advisors to them. This decade saw an increasing presence of the 
Soviet Navy, culminating with the establishment of Soviet military bases in Vietnam. 
 The 1972 Sino-American rapprochement encouraged Hanoi to move closer to 
Moscow,66 both to protect its unification efforts and to guard against China. Hanoi was 
also concerned with China’s forceful occupation of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and with 
developments in Cambodia, particularly the aggressive behavior of the China-backed 
Khmer Rouge regime. Since the mid-1950s, Hanoi had recognized China’s claim of these 
islands (and the rest of the South China Sea), but it later withdrew that recognition and in 
1975 also laid claim to the Paracels and the Spratlys, drawing bitter responses from 
Beijing.67 After wooing Hanoi after 1975 by offering both diplomatic and economic 
support and with the advent of a growing Sino-American-Japan axis in 1978, on 
November 3, 1978 Moscow and Hanoi signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. 68 
In that year, Sino-Vietnamese disputes broke out over issues of their common border and 
ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. For Hanoi, the 1978 treaty was “an attempt to deter China 
from military retaliation in response to its planned invasion of Cambodia.”69 The treaty 
provided a basis for the deployment of Soviet military ships and aircraft in Cam Ranh 
Bay after March 1979. This deployment aggravated Vietnamese and Soviet relations with 
China and ASEAN countries.  
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 Beijing’s response was an extension of Sino-Soviet tensions and linked to other 
conflict areas, particularly Afghanistan. In May 1978, Beijing downgraded its own 
relations with Vietnam and escalated its military presence along their border. In July 
1978, Beijing cautioned ASEAN that Vietnam and not China was the real threat. In 
November 1978, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore 
and voiced concern over the Soviet-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Prior 
to Deng’s visit, in October 1978, the Soviet Union had dispatched Vice Foreign Minister 
Nikolai Firyubin to visit the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand to give a positive 
assessment of ASEAN’s regional order concept (ZOPFAN) without supporting it. One of 
his objectives was to allay fears that the Hanoi-Moscow alignment could be directed 
against ASEAN.70 
3. Efforts to Expand ZOPFAN to Indochina 
 The ASEAN Declaration reflected the concern that Southeast Asia was being 
divided, and regional developments confirmed the existence of two orders, namely 
ASEAN’s ZOPFAN in the maritime sub-region and Vietnam’s hegemony in the 
Indochina sub-region. In Indochina, three important developments occurred in the mid-
1970s: the unification of Vietnam in 1975 and the subsequent establishment of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976, the overthrow of the Lon Nol regime by the pro-
China Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and the Pathet Lao’s rise to power in Vientiane. These 
developments were to some degree functions of Sino-Soviet competition,  while ASEAN 
was clearly concerned at the prospects of renewed regional instabilities caused by 
communist insurgencies. Strategically, moreover, the domination of Indochina by 
Vietnam—supported by the Soviet Union and opposed by China, which supported the 
Khmer Rouge—upset  the envisioned order of ASEAN that would moderate great power 
competition. 
 The regional association’s summit in Bali in 1976, as one scholar put it, was 
important “as a display of solidarity and collective nerve in the close wake of the success 
of revolutionary communism in Indochina.” The summit adopted a political role for 
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ASEAN,71 whereby ZOPFAN was recognized for the first time as an ASEAN enterprise 
(the 1971 Kuala Lumpur meeting was not formally an ASEAN meeting). The summit 
also decided that the member countries would perform security cooperation only on a 
non-ASEAN basis, therefore rejecting a collective defense role for the regional body. On 
their part, Vietnamese leaders saw the organization as pro-American and rejected 
ASEAN’s effort to extend ZOPFAN to Indochina, although they made efforts to 
strengthen diplomatic relations on the bilateral level. Hanoi also sought to establish 
relations with Washington, which Indonesia and Malaysia supported in order to reduce 
Vietnam’s dependence on the Soviet Union and ease tension with ASEAN.72 The 
following year, ASEAN held its second summit in Kuala Lumpur, which was signified 
by the presence of the prime ministers of Japan, Australia and New Zealand, as a 
recognition and enhancement of ASEAN’s regional standing. The United States began 
meeting with ASEAN at the senior officials level in September 1977. 
 In July and September 1978, Vietnam’s high-ranking officials visited ASEAN 
countries to reach a political agreement on friendship, including a non-aggression pact 
with Thailand. This mission failed to reach that objective although it came to a common 
understanding with ASEAN countries on the need to strengthen trading relations. 
Vietnam also proposed  establishing with ASEAN a “Zone of Peace, Independence and 
Neutrality” to stress the exclusion of external powers in regional affairs. However, it did 
not receive a favorable response. Other than suspecting Hanoi’s motive, ASEAN also 
wanted to avoid offending Beijing, which had supported ZOPFAN.73 On December 25, 
1978, Vietnam invaded and occupied Cambodia, opening up a completely new chapter in 
great power and regional politics. 
B. THE PERIOD 1978-1992 
 Over the next one and a half decades, Southeast Asia witnessed not only great 
power tensions and regional conflicts, but also an underlying competition between 
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differing concepts of regional order, particularly between alignment, on the one hand, and 
autonomy and engagement on the other.  
1. Sino-American Opposition to Soviet Hegemonism 
 Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in 1979 created international crises and reflected worsening relations 
between the United States and China on one side, and the Soviet Union on the other side. 
President Jimmy Carter abandoned détente and his successor President Ronald Reagan 
carried out a huge military buildup and challenged the Soviet Union at strategic 
geographic points. East Asia was a focus of U.S. strategy, out of the need to protect Japan 
and East Asia’s sea-lanes of communications from increased Soviet naval presence and 
activities. America also had to protect its economic interests in the region. America’s 
trade with East Asia  had since the early 1970s surpassed its cross-Atlantic trade,  
accounting for around 30% of total American trade, while its investments in the region 
surpassed $30 billion.74 
 America’s Soviet policy included building closer relations with China, with  
whom it established diplomatic relations in 1979, strengthening forwardly deployed 
military forces, and supporting ASEAN’s role in the Third Indochina War. The most 
serious hurdle to Sino-American relations was the U.S. policy toward Taiwan. 
Washington agreed to the “three conditions” that Beijing had demanded since 1975: 
withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Taiwan, severance of diplomatic relations with 
Taipei, and termination of U.S.-Taiwan mutual security treaty of 1954. Washington, 
however, insisted on maintaining the right to supply arms to Taiwan and “acknowledged” 
(as opposed to “recognized”) China’s claim over Taiwan. Both sides faced difficulties in 
establishing relations, including opposition from their respective hardliners.  However, 
the Soviet threat was sufficient to satisfy the domestic constituents of the need for 
improved relations and, subsequently, for American sales of dual use technology and 
non-lethal weaponry, and for European arms sales.75 
                     74 Simon, Sheldon W., “The Great Powers and Southeast Asia: Cautious Minuet or Dangerous 
Tango?” Asian Survey, Vol. 25, Issue 9 (Sep., 1985), p. 920. 
75 Garver, pp. 90-92. 
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 The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war triggered American 
responses to the heightened tensions and to the need to protect the supply of oil. The 
renewed tensions increased the strategic value of Southeast Asia’s waters for the 
American Cold War efforts and particularly for its naval movements. The Reagan 
administration implemented a “horizontal escalation” deterrence strategy that linked and 
balanced Soviet continental superiority in Europe, which was the primary threat, with 
American maritime superiority in the Pacific. In August 1986, the U.S. Navy 
implemented its new “Maritime Strategy” by conducting simultaneous exercises in the 
Northern Pacific, around the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Sea of Japan, and the 
Norwegian Sea, all of which were in the proximity of Soviet military bases that forced 
Soviet ships to stay close to home.76 In the early 1980s, the American strategy was 
paralleled by continuing Sino-Soviet tensions that tied down Soviet Far East forces. A 
State Department senior official gave positive testimony about China in 1981: “Our 
security and that of Japan, South Korea and our ASEAN friends have been demonstrably 
enhanced by the growth of close U.S.-China ties … In short, the U.S.-China relationship 
is a major component in our global and regional security policies.”77 In this period, no 
significant American military assets were permanently based in Southeast Asia; rather, 
the U.S. bases in the Philippine (Clark Air Field and Subic Bay) stored, trained, and 
repaired ships and aircraft, and provided the infrastructure for surge capability should the 
need arise. The U.S. Navy trained regularly with regional navies.78 In diplomacy, 
Washington supported ASEAN’s efforts to deny recognition of Vietnam’s occupation of 
Cambodia and its puppet government while reaffirming the U.S.-Thailand security 
alliance. 
 China’s primary security concern was with Soviet’s strategic encirclement, with 
Vietnam and Afghanistan added to the Soviet military presence in Mongolia and its 
                     76 Vistica, Gregory L., Fall from Glory: The Men Who Sank the U.S. Navy, pp. 215-18. Simon & 
Schuster, 1995. 
77 Testimony by John H. Holdridge, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific affairs, 
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 16 July 1981. 
Quoted in Kennedy, Scott, China Cross Talk: The American Debate over China Policy since 
Normalization, pp. 25-26. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. 
78 Simon, Sheldon W., “U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia: The Future of Military Presence,” Asian 
Survey, Vol. 31, Issue 7 (Jul., 1991), p. 668. 
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security cooperation with India. Southeast Asia was therefore an important strategic 
consideration in Beijing. The acting chief of China’s Liaison Office in Washington, in a 
discussion with the American National Security Advisor in 1977, gave his country’s 
assessment of Southeast Asia’s political situation: 
The Vietnam’s situation constitutes a part of the Soviet Union’s global strategy 
… [Vietnam] desires to be not only the chief of the Indochina federation but to 
become the chief of all of Southeast Asia … to replace the ASEAN organization 
and thereby achieve its ambition. As a matter of fact, this represents a copy of the 
Soviet collective security system idea for Southeast Asia. … We consider the 
Vietnam situation to be more serious than Afghanistan.79 
Beijing, thus, welcomed the renewed American containment and armed buildup. 
American cooperation also facilitated China’s military incursion into Vietnam in 1979 to 
teach Hanoi “a lesson,” which the United States did not oppose and tacitly encouraged. 
However, in spite of the close relationship with the U.S. and its allies in an anti-Soviet 
front, Beijing was deeply angered by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and the continued 
American arms sales to Taiwan. Moreover, China was facing continued Soviet pressure, 
including threat of nuclear attack. Therefore, in 1982 China decided to reorient its 
relations with the superpowers and declared its “independent foreign policy,” stressing 
that it “never attaches itself to any big power or group of powers, and never yields to 
pressure from any big power.”80 Beijing began to search for ways to improve relations 
with the Soviet Union but insisted that Moscow fulfill Beijing’s conditionalities, known 
as the “three obstacles”: to pressure Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, to withdraw 
from Afghanistan, and to withdraw its military from Mongolia and reduce its forces along 
their border.81 
 Moscow, for its part, was interested  in improving relations with Beijing to 
counter America’s aggressive military policy and buildup. The expansion of the U.S. 
Navy and its “Maritime Strategy” had prevented any consolidation of earlier Soviet 
strategic gains, such as its naval deployment in the South China Sea. Different from the 
                     79 Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Ambassador Han Hsu, 
White House, 2 August 1977, pp. 5-7. 
80 Report to the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Hu Yaobang, 1 September 
1982. 
81 Garver, pp. 100-01. 
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American naval presence in the West Pacific, the Soviets had no meaningful economic 
relations with the region to provide a reliable basis for political and logistical support to 
its naval presence, thereby creating a strategic weakness. Table 1 below shows that 
Soviet trade with Southeast Asia was negligible, especially when compared to American 
regional trade and growing Chinese trade. Instead, Soviet naval projection was limited to 
threatening American and Japanese interests and thus—by extension—regional countries 
as well. Moreover, Moscow had to support Vietnam economically and militarily, 
including its military campaign in Cambodia that was estimated to cost $4-6 billion per 
year.82 This support also earned Moscow the ASEAN countries’ distrust. 
 After taking office in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev took steps to change Moscow’s 
strategy. In a speech on July 28, 1986 in Vladivostok, the Soviet Far East city selected to 
symbolize Moscow’s new Asia-Pacific posture, Gorbachev indicated his country’s 
willingness to address the “three obstacles.” He also revived the idea of Asian collective 
security, first put forward by Brezhnev in 1969. Beijing welcomed the speech; in fact 
Sino-Soviet relations were already improving with increasing trade and people-to-people 
exchanges.  However, other East Asian capitals were unenthusiastic about the revived 
Brezhnev doctrine because of the continued Vietnam occupation of Cambodia.83 After 
the Vladivostok speech, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan and Mongolia and 
pressured Vietnam to leave Cambodia. 
2. Polarization of Southeast Asia 
 Closer Sino-American cooperation against the Soviet Union reinforced Southeast 
Asia’s division, which Sino-American hostilities in the 1960s had helped to create.  The 
initial reaction  by ASEAN the occupation of Cambodia was to rely on the great powers 
by placing its hopes on United Nations Security Council intervention. ASEAN’s foreign 
ministers, meeting in Bangkok on 12 January 1979, “welcomed the decision of the 
United Nations Security Council to consider without delay the situation in Indochina, and 
strongly urged the Council to take the necessary and appropriate measures to restore 
                     82 Acharya, p. 118. 
83 Buszynski, Leszek, “International Linkages and Regional Interests in Soviet Asia-Pacific Policy,” 
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peace, security and stability in the area.”84 The Security Council could not decide on a 
course of action because of disagreements among its permanent members. Therefore, 
with the support of the UN Secretary-General, ASEAN would henceforth lead the 
diplomatic efforts regionally and internationally. 
 In its efforts, ASEAN maintained a consistent position: total withdrawal of 
foreign forces, self-determination and national reconciliation, support for the Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea under Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and the 
willingness to consult with all parties concerned on a comprehensive political settlement. 
China and the United States supported this position throughout the 1980s. However, a 
closer look at  the efforts of ASEAN reveals two sides to  its diplomatic efforts, which 
could be  considered corollaries to ASEAN’s realist-idealist or outward-inward 
approaches to great power politics of the 1970s. On the one side, Singapore led 
diplomatic efforts in the United Nations, having a direct interest in resisting any kind of 
occupation of a smaller country by a larger neighbor. It was highly effective in forging a 
consensus within ASEAN and the United Nations General Assembly as far as the 
occupation was concerned. Thailand, whose security was directly threatened by Vietnam, 
sought closer security relationships with China and the United States. The first diplomatic 
success by ASEAN took the form of convening the International Conference on 
Cambodia in New York in July 1981 under the auspices of the UN secretary-general; 
nonetheless, it failed to bring Vietnam and the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. This 
problem was compounded by Chinese-ASEAN disagreement over the nature of the 
political settlement. China, supported by the United States, rejected the proposal for an 
interim administration before the holding of UN-supervised elections.85 
 On the other side of ASEAN’s diplomacy were efforts to address Vietnam’s 
security concerns and, therefore, to limit the impact of great power politics. Indonesia and 
Malaysia, which perceived China rather than Vietnam as the greater threat, maintained 
relatively less hostile attitudes toward Vietnam. In 1980, President Suharto of Indonesia 
and Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn of Malaysia issued the Kuantan Statement, which 
                     84 Joint Statement by the Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting on the Current Political 
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“envisaged Vietnam free of the influence of both China and the Soviet Union and which 
also took account of Vietnam’s security interests in Indochina.”86 The statement was 
consistent with Indonesia’s position  regarding the region’s freedom (from external 
interference) and Malaysia’s position on neutrality. Thailand, however, rejected the 
statement and it was, thus, not openly pursued by Indonesia and Malaysia in order to 
maintain ASEAN solidarity. China and the United States were not supportive of this 
approach either because they were primarily concerned with Vietnam’s withdrawal from, 
and not its security interests in, Cambodia.87 
 Indonesia’s stance in the long run moderated the Singaporean and Thai approach 
and  proved to be instrumental in searching for a solution in the late 1980s, as well as 
Vietnam’s ASEAN membership in 1995,  since this approach accommodated Vietnam’s 
security concerns. With ASEAN’s backing, Jakarta hosted a series of dialogues in 1988-
89 of all the involved parties and concerned regional countries, known as the Jakarta 
Informal Meetings (JIMs). The basis for these dialogues was the “Ho Chi Minh City 
Understanding” of July 1987 between the foreign ministers of Vietnam and Indonesia, 
the latter functioning as the ASEAN interlocutor on Cambodia. The understanding 
devised a two-stage dialogue, first among the Cambodian factions and, subsequently, 
between the Cambodians, Indonesia, Vietnam and other concerned countries. The 
informal meetings made progress because they took place during a period of relaxed 
tensions among the great powers and, particularly, in Sino-Soviet relations, which 
permitted improved Sino-Vietnamese relations. The positive international atmosphere, 
combined with ASEAN’s diplomatic groundwork, prepared the way for the Paris 
International Conferences held in July-August 1989 and October 1991. The 1991 
conference approved a comprehensive political settlement to the conflict and agreed, 
among other things, on Cambodia’s neutrality. This reaffirmed Cambodia’s position in 
the 1960s before being compromised by the great powers during the Second Indochina 
War. Cambodia’s newly won neutrality was also the outcome of ASEAN’s sensitivity to 
Vietnam’s security concerns represented in the Ho Chi Minh City Understanding. 
                     86 Leifer, p. 135. 
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Ambassador Vladimir Polyakov, Moscow, 29 May 1988, p. 5.  
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 The Cambodian problem caused uncertainty about ASEAN’s concept of the 
regional order of ZOPFAN. At the annual ASEAN foreign ministers’ meetings in 1976-
78, ZOPFAN had been mentioned primarily as the regional framework to address great 
power politics.  Between 1978 and 1980, ZOPFAN became the foreign ministers’ 
rallying point to limit external interference and to appeal to Vietnam’s security interests. 
Between 1981 and 1983, ZOPFAN was either not referred to in the foreign ministers’ 
communiqué or mentioned only briefly in the context of Indochina. Beginning in 1984 
onwards, ZOPFAN again became one of the central themes of the ASEAN foreign 
ministers’ meeting, but no longer for regional autonomy since ASEAN cooperated with 
China and the United States on the Cambodian issue. In 1985-88, the Cambodian 
problem was consistently described as an “impediment” or “obstacle” to the early 
realization of ZOPFAN. Meanwhile, the foreign ministers in 1984 in Jakarta agreed to 
revive the Working Group on ZOPFAN and to study the possibility of establishing a 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Southeast Asia (NWFZ). The NWFZ concept had been a 
central element of the ZOPFAN Declaration (1971);  however, it was not pursued. In 
1987, ASEAN began the drafting of a NWFZ treaty, a process which continued until its 
adoption in 1995. 
 Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia, which began in 1988, and the subsequent 
resolution of the Cambodian problem not only involved great power relations and took 
place at the beginning of the end of the Cold War, but also signified the assent of 
ASEAN’s approach to regional order. This order is characterized by greater autonomy 
from the major powers through the reduction of their direct security involvement—
though not necessarily overall engagement—in regional affairs. The end of the Cold War, 
however, brought forward another question: how should the region deal with America’s 
preeminence and China’s rise? The next chapter will deal with Sino-American post-Cold 
War relations. 
  31 
Table 1.   Trade Statistics between Southeast Asia and China, the United States, and 
the Soviet Union, 1971-1992 (in US$ million)88 
 
China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R.
x … … … … 14.7 … … 20.8 … 0.1 50.8 … … 74.4 …
m 2.5 35.3 … 3.1 20.4 … 6.9 23.4 … 5.1 37.5 … 4.9 61.8 …
x … 192.4 10.2 … 265.3 6.7 0.4 465.4 5.7 … 1,580.3 26.0 … 1,866.0 26.0
m 27.6 174.1 12.4 39.0 242.9 5.7 48.8 512.6 2.9 113.9 609.8 12.8 204.0 670.0 37.0
x 18.2 208.0 49.8 27.1 237.8 36.4 80.7 322.9 102.7 87.1 595.4 175.0 52.0 612.0 103.0
m 66.1 96.7 3.6 69.0 144.5 4.0 147.6 205.0 6.8 195.4 397.3 4.2 149.0 377.0 5.0
x … 452.9 … 2.7 434.2 1.2 6.6 686.7 7.9 13.4 1,133.1 18.4 23.0 663.1 10.4
m … 330.6 … 1.7 352.1 … 24.3 506.7 0.9 27.0 828.8 … 50.8 816.6 0.3
x 15.2 207.4 7.9 20.4 337.5 10.0 53.1 622.8 18.3 51.3 862.6 19.2 41.0 746.0 54.0
m 132.9 360.1 1.6 141.9 476.4 1.4 236.1 777.6 3.9 264.6 1,174.4 7.4 286.0 1,279.0 8.0
262.5 2,057.5 85.5 304.9 2,525.8 65.4 604.5 4,143.9 149.1 757.9 7,270.0 263.0 810.7 7,165.9 243.7
16% 23% -24% 98% 64% 128% 25% 75% 76% 7% -1% -7%
94% 78% 26% 73% 79% 9% 44% 85% 9% 44% 84% 21% 60% 88% 10%
x … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
m … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
x … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
m 0.1 6.2 0.8 … 7.4 0.7 … 4.0 0.2 … 3.1 0.1 … 4.0 …
x 0.5 0.2 1.5 0.7 3.3 3.2 1.8 0.2 0.6 3.6 1.2 0.4 16.4 0.5 0.6
m 11.2 5.6 2.6 13.4 6.1 4.7 19.5 3.7 2.5 19.1 5.4 4.2 20.5 29.2 4.3
x … 108.9 6.0 … 136.4 3.4 … 158.4 3.3 0.2 193.7 18.7 19.2 244.0 9.7
m … 183.3 3.8 … 232.6 3.5 … 270.9 2.4 4.5 424.2 7.2 16.9 471.5 8.8
x … 0.3 162.0 64.0 0.7 542.0 690.0 2.2 1,195.0 807.0 9.3 609.0 304.0 6.6 1,836.0
m 5.0 272.0 61.0 35.0 284.2 101.0 68.0 304.5 233.0 123.0 742.1 375.0 171.0 234.6 280.0
16.8 576.5 237.7 113.1 670.7 658.5 779.3 743.9 1,437.0 957.4 1,379.0 1,014.6 548.0 990.4 2,139.4
573% 16% 177% 589% 11% 118% 23% 85% -29% -43% -28% 111%
6% 22% 74% 27% 21% 91% 56% 15% 91% 56% 16% 79% 40% 12% 90%
279.3 2,634.0 323.2 418.0 3,196.5 723.9 1,383.8 4,887.8 1,586.1 1,715.3 8,649.0 1,277.6 1,358.7 8,156.3 2,383.1















































                     88 Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (1978, 1982, 
1989,1995, 2002) 
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China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R.
x … 141.7 … … 148.8 … … 165.5 … … 210.8 … … 266.2 …
m 6.5 62.5 … 6.9 58.2 0.1 8.3 41.9 0.1 11.0 66.6 … 13.6 77.1 …
x … 2,452.0 37.0 … 3,011.0 32.0 … 2,962.0 52.0 … 3,171.0 55.0 … 4,303.0 73.0
m 132.0 988.0 17.0 154.0 777.0 13.0 122.0 839.0 15.0 132.0 1,053.0 14.0 197.0 1,409.0 20.0
x 45.0 826.0 119.0 120.0 1,105.0 119.0 110.0 1,379.0 139.0 182.0 1,913.0 259.0 217.0 2,119.0 290.0
m 134.0 487.0 10.0 141.0 560.0 11.0 221.0 824.0 7.0 223.0 1,173.0 10.0 253.0 1,632.0 27.0
x 38.3 926.3 87.2 109.1 1,113.6 130.1 47.5 1,159.1 40.4 51.2 1,382.9 83.3 45.0 1,593.6 189.3
m 56.6 876.6 2.2 83.1 880.7 4.5 117.9 1,079.9 6.2 127.2 1,508.2 8.6 219.1 1,957.7 23.4
x 39.0 965.0 65.0 59.0 1,279.0 80.0 58.0 1,626.0 114.0 170.0 1,967.0 182.0 307.0 2,424.0 236.0
m 267.0 1,198.0 20.0 275.0 1,324.0 26.0 342.0 1,664.0 23.0 411.0 2,527.0 24.0 629.0 3,389.0 24.0
718.4 8,923.1 357.4 948.1 10,257.3 415.7 1,026.7 11,740.4 396.7 1,307.4 14,972.5 635.9 1,880.7 19,170.6 882.7
-11% 25% 47% 32% 15% 16% 8% 14% -5% 27% 28% 60% 44% 28% 39%
59% 92% 12% 62% 92% 18% 85% 90% 95% 79% 89% 92% 77% 90% 83%
x … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
m … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
x … 1.1 … … 1.0 … … 1.1 … … 1.9 … … 1.0
m … 0.6 … … … … … 1.5 … … 1.5 … … 0.2 …
x 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.9 0.7 1.0 28.2 2.3 1.8 11.6 3.9 2.6 8.3 5.5
m 9.3 10.3 1.4 18.7 17.8 2.2 18.1 44.7 1.6 17.6 35.1 1.0 17.1 31.7 0.5
x 61.4 299.1 1.9 102.1 340.2 4.0 76.8 450.5 7.2 77.0 593.8 40.5 123.7 823.1 164.4
m 71.7 480.8 12.2 67.2 572.0 14.8 83.9 734.8 8.6 241.9 1,122.6 8.0 416.6 1,332.4 11.4
x 135.0 1.9 2,308.0 171.0 0.4 1,627.0 … 0.2 … … 0.5 … … … …
m 222.0 1.2 239.0 226.0 0.1 252.0 … 2.0 … … 0.6 … … 1.2 …
499.5 795.4 2,563.2 585.2 932.4 1,900.7 179.8 1,263.0 19.7 338.3 1,767.6 53.4 560.0 2,197.9 181.8
-9% -20% 20% 17% 17% -26% -69% 35% -99% 88% 40% 171% 66% 24% 240%
41% 8% 88% 38% 8% 82% 15% 10% 5% 21% 11% 8% 23% 10% 17%
1,217.9 9,718.5 2,920.6 1,533.3 11,189.7 2,316.4 1,206.5 13,003.4 416.4 1,645.7 16,740.1 689.3 2,440.7 21,368.5 1,064.5
-10% 19% 23% 26% 15% -21% -21% 16% -82% 36% 29% 66% 48% 28% 54%
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China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R.
x … 311.5 … … 482.6 … … 272.8 … … 176.3 … … 215.2 …
m 13.6 49.6 … 13.5 124.2 … 13.6 141.3 … 12.4 94.6 … 12.0 94.3 …
x … 5,830.0 66.0 14.0 3,546.0 22.0 27.0 4,267.0 50.0 8.0 4,505.0 59.0 84.0 4,040.0 78.0
m 197.0 1,432.0 20.0 231.0 2,417.0 39.0 204.0 2,534.0 25.0 224.0 2,560.0 12.0 249.0 1,721.0 3.0
x 88.0 1,166.0 259.0 110.0 1,399.0 240.0 157.0 1,864.0 302.0 165.0 2,231.0 213.0 161.0 1,970.0 182.0
m 274.0 1,682.0 25.0 277.0 2,181.0 27.0 270.0 2,127.0 17.0 285.0 2,295.0 18.0 251.0 1,881.0 19.0
x 74.9 1,747.1 145.8 105.2 1,588.5 115.2 22.4 1,792.6 86.1 60.2 2,031.5 54.4 80.9 1,658.3 32.7
m 242.1 1,951.1 9.2 222.7 1,860.9 13.2 79.6 1,831.3 17.3 227.8 1,713.5 4.1 290.5 1,343.8 13.1
x 179.0 2,770.0 163.0 240.0 2,612.0 218.0 213.0 3,954.0 180.0 243.0 4,823.0 358.0 333.0 4,830.0 241.0
m 772.0 3,484.0 46.0 881.0 3,632.0 82.0 827.0 4,261.0 47.0 1,347.0 4,179.0 40.0 2,268.0 3,988.0 13.0
1,840.6 20,423.3 734.0 2,094.4 19,843.2 756.4 1,813.6 23,045.0 724.4 2,572.4 24,608.9 758.5 3,729.4 21,741.6 581.8
-2% 7% -17% 14% -3% 3% -13% 16% -4% 42% 7% 5% 45% -12% -23%
77% 90% 68% 78% 90% 77% 81% 91% 86% 82% 90% 86% 87% 90% 83%
x … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
m … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
x … 1.0 … 6.2 1.5 … 4.2 2.6 … 4.9 2.0 … 8.6 0.5 …
m … 0.3 … … 0.4 … … 0.1 … … 0.1 … … 0.2
x 2.6 14.5 5.5 13.8 16.3 14.5 14.3 10.6 14.5 13.2 13.4 15.9 40.6 13.3 16.7
m 17.1 37.4 0.5 34.5 37.3 21.2 34.8 16.9 21.2 33.5 17.5 23.4 38.6 10.8 24.5
x 139.0 910.1 330.3 306.6 880.8 183.1 107.3 953.2 65.4 182.6 1,273.0 72.1 270.9 1,401.6 62.7
m 388.7 1,192.3 15.1 233.7 1,144.1 13.0 265.2 1,299.0 16.9 318.0 1,408.9 16.2 222.7 1,052.0 17.7
x … 0.1 … … … … … … … … 0.1 … … …
m … 11.3 … … 35.3 … … 22.8 … … 24.3 … … 22.2 …
547.4 2,167.0 351.4 594.8 2,115.7 231.8 425.8 2,305.2 118.0 552.2 2,739.3 127.6 581.4 2,500.6 121.6
-2% -1% 93% 9% -2% -34% -28% 9% -49% 30% 19% 8% 5% -9% -5%
23% 10% 32% 22% 10% 23% 19% 9% 14% 18% 10% 14% 13% 10% 17%
2,388.0 22,590.3 1,085.4 2,689.2 21,958.9 988.2 2,239.4 25,350.2 842.4 3,124.6 27,348.2 886.1 4,310.8 24,242.2 703.4
-2% 6% 2% 13% -3% -9% -17% 15% -15% 40% 8% 5% 38% -11% -21%
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China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R. China U.S. U.S.S.R.
x … 109.6 … 0.7 15.0 … 5.4 35.0 … … 93.0 … … 76.0 … … 26.0 …
m 12.4 79.9 … 4.2 102.0 … 3.4 94.0 … … 109.0 … … 153.0 … … 152.0 …
x 139.0 2,902.0 52.0 343.0 3,349.0 82.0 492.0 3,138.0 38.0 534.0 3,475.0 96.0 834.0 3,365.0 81.0 1,191.0 3,509.0 40.0
m 337.0 1,482.0 5.0 408.0 1,415.0 16.0 410.0 1,734.0 46.0 537.0 2,216.0 51.0 653.0 2,520.0 55.0 835.0 3,397.0 47.0
x 163.0 2,297.0 130.0 279.0 2,972.0 153.0 415.0 3,663.0 129.0 481.0 4,684.0 250.0 619.0 4,986.0 137.0 639.0 5,808.0 81.0
m 282.0 2,034.0 11.0 374.0 2,376.0 20.0 482.0 2,925.0 42.0 609.0 3,803.0 77.0 561.0 4,944.0 80.0 802.0 5,626.0 75.0
x 101.1 1,709.3 15.0 87.9 2,060.4 30.2 67.0 2,512.0 22.0 50.0 2,935.0 26.0 62.0 3,104.0 … 128.0 3,151.0 15.0
m 120.6 1,293.4 16.4 216.6 1,539.4 14.5 266.0 1,823.0 27.0 242.0 2,132.0 21.0 182.0 2,538.0 39.0 243.0 2,610.0 38.0
x 571.0 5,257.0 130.0 737.0 7,000.0 187.0 1,193.0 9,370.0 129.0 1,199.0 10,432.0 194.0 799.0 11,215.0 334.0 858.0 11,674.0 324.0
m 1,430.0 3,819.0 36.0 1,412.0 4,786.0 40.0 1,691.0 6,824.0 93.0 1,698.0 8,522.0 129.0 2,095.0 9,801.0 96.0 2,227.0 10,501.0 193.0
3,156.1 20,983.2 395.4 3,862.4 25,614.8 542.7 5,024.8 32,118.0 526.0 5,350.0 38,401.0 844.0 5,805.0 42,702.0 822.0 6,923.0 46,454.0 813.0
-15% -3% -32% 22% 22% 37% 30% 25% -3% 6% 20% 60% 9% 11% -3% 19% 9% -1%
83% 88% 74% 78% 87% 81% 81% 84% 80% 80% 84% 26% 79% 83% 25% 78% 82% 47%
x … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
m … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
x 8.8 0.3 … 9.7 0.9 … 16.0 3.0 … 11.0 1.0 … 6.0 … … 2.0 2.0 …
m … … … 0.7 0.2 … 3.0 1.0 … 5.0 … … 16.0 1.0 … 12.0 1.0 …
x 52.2 13.9 17.5 86.4 11.6 21.0 2.0 1.0 5.0 3.0 2.0 7.0 33.0 9.0 9.0 96.0 27.0 10.0
m 41.4 17.6 25.8 75.5 8.6 30.9 8.0 15.0 7.0 6.0 12.0 5.0 138.0 19.0 6.0 315.0 26.0 7.0
x 275.5 1,606.1 71.7 387.5 2,163.3 33.8 475.0 3,200.0 61.0 541.0 4,358.0 265.0 269.0 5,240.0 103.0 335.0 6,068.0 74.0
m 263.1 1,312.0 21.3 503.9 1,619.7 41.0 679.0 2,753.0 60.0 744.0 2,842.0 82.0 1,107.0 3,600.0 179.0 1,149.0 3,989.0 252.0
x … 0.1 … … … … … … … … … 549.0 8.0 … 920.0 19.0 … 215.0
m … 33.0 … … 25.6 … … 17.0 … … … 1,533.0 5.0 1.0 1,211.0 18.0 1.0 358.0
641.0 2,983.0 136.3 1,063.7 3,829.9 126.7 1,183.0 5,990.0 133.0 1,310.0 7,215.0 2,441.0 1,582.0 8,870.0 2,428.0 1,946.0 10,114.0 916.0
10% 19% 12% 66% 28% -7% 11% 56% 5% 11% 20% 1735% 21% 23% -1% 23% 14% -62%
17% 12% 26% 22% 13% 19% 19% 16% 20% 20% 16% 74% 21% 17% 75% 22% 18% 53%
3,797.1 23,966.2 531.7 4,926.1 29,444.7 669.4 6,207.8 38,108.0 659.0 6,660.0 45,616.0 3,285.0 7,387.0 51,572.0 3,250.0 8,869.0 56,568.0 1,729.0
-12% -1% 30% 23% 26% 26% 29% -2% 7% 20% 398% 11% 13% -1% 20% 10% -47%
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III. SINO-AMERICAN POST-COLD 
WAR STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND 
EAST ASIA 
 This chapter elaborates on Chinese and American grand strategies and determines 
the nature of their competition, followed by an analysis on their interests and capabilities 
in East Asia. It is about the relationship between China as a rising power, measured by its 
maritime expansion as well as expanding and deepening relations with Southeast Asian, 
and the United States as a status-quo power, seen from its efforts to prevent the rise of a 
peer competitor and to maintain its wide and deep relations with rim land East Asia. 
 Muthiah Alagappa expresses this point of view: “the end of the Cold War marked 
the end of the domination of Asia and its international politics by Western powers and the 
emergence of a more autonomous Asian regional system.”89 Another observer who takes 
a long-term perspective describes China-U.S. relations as follows: 
Since the US has spent the last 100 odd years focused on preserving an Asian 
status-quo, that did not exclude the US, deciding how best to preserve the [sic] 
today’s status-quo—also known as stability—will be major preoccupation of US 
security planners for the next two or three decades. Beijing’s vision of a “future 
security system” being marketed as “A New Concept of Security” is the 
antithesis of the US alliance-based approach. We are facing a competition of 
concepts about how best to provide stability in the region. 90[Italics in original] 
Meanwhile, the New York Times in October 2003 made the following assessment of 
China’s rise and America’s relative position in Asia: “More than 50 years of American 
dominance in Asia is subtly but unmistakably eroding as Asian countries look toward 
China as the increasingly vital regional power … [because] China’s churning economic 
engine, coupled with trade deals and friendly diplomacy, have transformed it from a 
country to be feared to one that beckons.”91 The United States, however, is a Pacific 
power and in its history has long been drawn to the Western Pacific. Unlike China, which 
                     89 Alagappa, Muthiah, (ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Calif: 
Stanford, 1998), 65. 
90 McDevitt, Michael, “US Security Strategy in East Asia,” November 6, 2002. 
http://web.mit.edu/ssp/fall02/fall02.html (30 October 2003). 
91 Perlez, Jane, “Asian Leaders Find China a More Cordial Neighbor,” New York Times, 18 October 
2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/18/international/asia. 
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has just begun to expand its regional relations, the United States maintains wide and deep 
relations with East Asia’s maritime region. This chapter evaluates the nature of Sino-
American relationship since the end of the Cold War and how it relates to Southeast 
Asia’s regional order, which will be the focus of Chapter IV. 
A. GRAND STRATEGY 
 The history of China – United States relations is characterized by contradictory 
expectations and suspicions, which they had not or could not manage to bridge in the 19th 
and 20th centuries. While the U.S. was growing as a major Pacific power, China was 
descending into poverty and chaos, becoming a target for division among the imperial 
powers  while sinking into civil war. Towards the mid-20th century, Japan became a 
growing threat to America’s interests in the Pacific and China became one of 
Washington’s hopes to withstand Japan; China, however, defied that expectation. In the 
Cold War’s first twenty years, China turned into America’s most dangerous enemy in 
Asia and had to be contained in Korea and Vietnam and in Southeast Asia in general, 
while China viewed the United States (and later the Soviet Union) as the greatest threat to 
its survival and aspiration to reunite with Taiwan. After the U.S.-PRC rapprochement in 
1972, their relations, though fluctuating, were held together by a common fear of the 
Soviet Union, whose demise in 1991 unraveled the strategic triangle. 
1. China: Continental Consolidation, Maritime Expansion 
 China is perhaps the most geopolitically complex country in the world having the 
largest number of neighbors. Traditionally and historically a continental country, China 
has developed interests and the intention to become a maritime power once again (it was 
for a long period before the mid-15th century the greatest maritime power). Some 
observers have argued that ideology and cultural tradition play a role in shaping Beijing’s 
foreign policy approach, but indications seem to portend that the role of ideology has 
diminished since China opened up in the late 1970s and embraced international trade and 
a de facto capitalism. Similarly, it is unlikely that cultural tradition plays an important 
role in China’s current external strategy. Nonetheless, China’s nationalism requires 
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serious attention because it is a driver in the effort to gain international and regional 
respectability. 
 China’s basic principles of inter-state relations—the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence—are devoid of moral and ideological overtones. These were formulated in 
the mid-1950s between Chinese and Indian leaders,  with the Chinese subsequently  
applying them to its relations with all non-socialist developing countries. Since the 1970s, 
China has applied these principles to all foreign relations.92 They consist of: (1) mutual 
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual 
non-interference in internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful 
coexistence. These principles preserve the state and its territory, and are particularly 
relevant for China in terms of the Taiwan, Tibet and other potential secession issues. 
China has found the principles particularly useful in the post-Cold War era in establishing 
closer relations with its smaller neighbors, who in turn are relieved because China, at 
least in principle, will restrain from interfering in their affairs. Beijing views the nature of 
inter-state relations primarily in realpolitik or “power politics” terms, where a state’s 
policy is “intended solely to promote relative national power without regard for moral 
principle.”  Beijing places great importance on the balance of power approach to manage 
potential conflicts with other major powers or coalitions.”93 
 Since the Cold War, China’s strategy in dealing with the great powers has been 
characterized by balance of power, where China leans on the weaker side to balance the 
more powerful and, thus, the more threatening power. The demise of the Soviet Union 
made the United States the most threatening power, exemplified by American ideological 
(i.e., democracy, human rights) pressures, its position on Taiwan and its military alliances 
with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia. Beijing looks at 
today’s world as a Cold Peace that is characterized by unfair and irrational international 
political and economic order and “new manifestations of hegemonism and power 
politics.”94 Post 9/11, Beijing recognizes the importance of stable relations with the 
                     92 Garver, John W., Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, p. 122. 
93 Glasser, 1993, quoted in Roy, Denny, China’s Foreign Relations, p. 37. Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers Inc., 1998. 
94 China’s National Defense in 2002, People’s Daily, at http://english.people.com.cn/features/ 
ndpaper2002/ndf.html (June 2003). 
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United States and the dangers posed by international terrorism, but it is also “suspicious 
that Washington is using the war on terrorism … to extend a decade-long effort to 
encircle China strategically.”95 It is fully cognizant that  one result of 9/11 is America’s 
renewed military relations with countries in China’s periphery, including in Southeast 
Asia’s maritime region. 
 As an extension of its balance of power approach, Beijing shifted its strategy to 
improve relations with neighboring countries under the banner of “good-neighborly 
policy.” This policy is in line with the strategy adopted in 1985 that identified threats as 
more likely coming from its periphery in the form of local and limited wars, with 
territorial disputes as the likely cause, rather than direct great power confrontation. 
Beijing also believes that the regional disputes and conflicts could easily invite the 
intervention of other great powers, namely the United States and Japan. Under this 
policy, Beijing seeks to “settle the disputes … with the surrounding countries through 
friendly consultations and negotiations. Should this fail to serve the purpose, we should 
put them aside for the time being, seeking common ground while reserving 
differences.”96 
 In order to promote economic development and maintain a stable environment, 
Beijing supports the establishment of multilateral forums to deal with security issues, 
namely the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) with Pacific Rim and South Asian countries 
in 1994, and the Shanghai Five with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 
1996.  This latter forum was subsequently strengthened in 2001 as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO). Beijing also moved to improve bilateral relations and 
tried to settle most of its land boundary disputes. Territorial disputes, acquisitions, or 
claims are at the heart of many of China’s conflicts or use of arms: Xinjiang (1949), Tibet 
(1950, 1959), Taiwan (1954, 1958, 1995-96), border disputes with India (1962) and the 
Soviet Union (1969), Paracels (1974) and the Spratlys (1988). Significantly, Beijing has 
managed to resolve many border issues with Russia (except for a few islands on the 
Ussuri River), Central Asian countries (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan), Laos and 
                     95 Miller, H. Lyman, “Beijing and the American War on Terrorism,” Strategic Insight, 1 July 2002 
www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/july02/eastAsia.asp (7 August 2002) 
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96 Report at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 12 September 1997, Beijing 
Review, 6-12 October 1997, p. 30. 
Vietnam. As to the South China Sea territorial disputes, which are the most complex, 
China has been promoting joint cooperation and deferment of the legal issue.  
 Beijing also seeks to balance the American preeminence by promoting a 
multipolar world, including establishing a strategic partnership with the Russian 
Federation since 1997.97 In this year also, China strengthened its relations with ASEAN 
and began to promote the idea of a “new security approach” based on its Five Principles 
of Peaceful Co-existence and “independent foreign policy of peace,”98 particularly the 
primacy of sovereignty and territorial integrity, economic development and exchanges, 
peaceful settlement of disputes, and security dialogue and cooperation over power 
politics. China maintains that disputes between states should be resolved “through 
peaceful means, and increasing mutual trust and resolving problems through friendly, 
frank, and sincere dialogues and consultations.”99 It argues that its close relationship with 
Russia and the Central Asian countries, the smooth Hong Kong settlement in 1997, and 
the South China Sea stabilization process are proof of the effectiveness of this approach. 
China, moreover, is advancing norms that have strengthened political relations with 
South Korea and Southeast Asian countries, which are already China’s most friendly 
neighbors.100 Its regional policy is also consistent with its broader strategy to promote a 
multipolar world. 
 Beijing does not formally and comprehensively reveal its security perception and 
intentions, but these may also be deduced from the kind of military it is developing. The 
priority given to naval modernization signifies a maritime orientation and explains three 
levels of considerations. The first and most immediate concern is Taiwan, where the 
People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN) is expected to be able to cordon the island 
and, if the U.S. intervenes, to counter any such move. The U.S. intervention during the 
                     97 Miller, H. Lyman, “The Limits of Chinese-Russian Strategic Collaboration,” Strategic Insight, 2 
September 2002, Center for Contemporary Conflict, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/sep02/ 
eastAsia.asp 
98 Report at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 12 September 1997, Beijing 
Review, 6-12 October 1997, p. 29. The “independent foreign policy of peace” was also reiterated in the 
2000 China Defense White Paper. 
99 “Text of Qian Qichen Speech to ARF,” 27 July 1997, in FBIS, document id FTS19970807000641. 
100 On China-South Korea improving relations, see for example James Brooke’s reportage: “China 
‘Looming Large’ In South Korea As Biggest Player, Replacing US,” New York Times, 3 January 2003. 
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1995-96 Taiwan Crisis, deploying carrier battle groups close to Taiwanese waters, was a 
reminder of China’s weakness in the face of America’s maritime power. Other immediate 
concerns are the protection of its coastal cities and sea-lanes of communications in 
Southeast Asia, through which China’s sea-borne trade and energy and mineral imports 
pass. The second consideration is the establishment of a defense perimeter far beyond 
China’s coastline, to turn “coastal defense” into “off shore defense.” The PLAN 
envisions becoming a blue water navy equipped with aircraft carriers, but this is a long-
term vision.  
 The third consideration is the need to turn the PLAN into an effective instrument 
to protect and enforce China’s territorial claims over the Spratly Islands and the whole 
South China Sea, without creating excessive fears that could prevent deeper economic 
and political relations with regional countries and  driving them to invite closer American 
security involvement. Finally, China will conceivably use its navy for political purposes 
as many maritime powers have done before: for “gunboat diplomacy.” The navy is the 
most politically flexible military instrument because its unique characteristics enable it to 
be deployed in international waters in a sustained manner while conveying a forceful 
diplomatic message or executing military action against a target country.101 The lower 
end of gunboat diplomacy is symbolic, such as showing the flag. The PLAN has 
undertaken foreign port visits and a global voyage to demonstrate China’s growing 
capability and “peaceful diplomacy and … [for the PLAN] as representatives of the state 
to exhibit its traits as an army of peace and civilization.”102 The navy’s flexibility in the 
political context can thus overcome its many technological shortcomings, and even 
though it is not yet on a par with the American, Japanese, Australian, and even Indian and 




                     101 Gunboat diplomacy is understood here as “the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than 
as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss in the furtherance of an international dispute.” 
Cable, James, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991, 3rd ed., p. 14. St. Martin’s Press, 1994. 
102 “Shi Yunsheng on Navy’s Development,” Liaowang, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0513, 19 April 1999. 
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2. United States: Preventing the Rise of a Peer Competitor 
 The American post-Cold War grand strategy is a combination of four 
approaches.103 Neo-isolationism, which is the least popular thus far, looks at America’s 
national interest and security as limited to its own territory. Selective engagement or “off-
shore balancer” seeks to manage peace among the major powers, arguing that any 
conflict among them will be the most costly and destructive and the United States cannot 
stay away from such conflicts. This approach assumes that U.S. economic and military 
relative advantage will gradually diminish, and, therefore, resources should not be used to 
police the world or to insist on primacy. Cooperative security or “internationalism” 
assumes that democracies rarely, if ever, fight each other. Since most great powers are 
democracies or are on the road to democracy, the chances are greater now for their 
cooperation to maintain world stability. Great powers like China must be engaged, as 
they are the biggest challenge to international peace. Primacy or “hegemonism” seeks to 
maintain U.S. dominance to ensure peace because a system based on balance of power 
will ultimately fail. 
 In the early 1990s, idealism in the form of the “new world order” concept 
characterized the United States approach. President George H.W. Bush envisioned a new 
world order that is “freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and 
more secure in the quest for peace. …  A world where the rule of law supplants the rule 
of the jungle. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.”104 His concept 
was based on collective security among the great powers, embodied in—though not 
limited to—the United Nations Security Council. It was strongly criticized by the right, 
which wanted the United States to remain supreme and unbound by a revived United 
Nations, and the left, which saw it as rationalization of the administration’s imperial 
ambitions.105 During his tenure, influential people in the administration, such as Dick 
Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz, began to promote the primacy approach. 
                     103 The following summary is drawn from Posen, Barry L. and Ross, Andres L., “Competing Visions 
for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-53. 
104 “Confrontation in the Gulf: Transcript of President’s Address to Joint Session of Congress,” The 
New York Times, 12 September 1990, 20. 
105 Judis, John B., “George Bush, Meet Woodrow Wilson,” The New York Times, 20 November 1990, 
21. 
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 An early indication of American primacism appeared in the Pentagon’s draft of 
the Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999 leaked to the New York 
Times in 1992. The draft addressed “the fundamentally new situation which has been 
created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the internal as well as 
the external empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global 
pretensions and influence.” It laid out the imperatives of America’s great power strategy: 
Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the 
territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order 
of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration 
underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to 
prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, 
under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.106 
 This objective contains a number of policy prescriptions: (1) to maintain U.S. 
leadership that convinces or deters potential competitors that they need not pursue a more 
aggressive posture because their legitimate interests are protected; (2) to discourage other 
industrial countries from challenging U.S. leadership; and (3) to maintain the 
mechanisms for deterring potential competitors by reconstituting American capabilities to 
ensure a predominant military position in the world.107 In East Asia, the draft stressed the 
need for the U.S. to “maintain our status as a military power of the first magnitude in the 
area … [therefore] enable the U.S. to continue to contribute to regional security and 
stability by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence [sic] of a vacuum or a 
regional hegemon.”108 Due to much public opposition, however, conceivably because of 
an inadequate public relations campaign, the administration was compelled to disavow 
and abandon the plan.  
 The Clinton administration was even more internationalist in its approach and in 
contrast to its predecessor, emphasized the application of universal values in the internal 
affairs of other states as a way to maintain international peace. The Clinton 
administration’s grand strategy, outlined in the National Security Strategy of Engagement 
and Enlargement, called for 
                     106 “Excerpts From Pentagon’s Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival,’” The New York 
Times, 8 March 1992, 14. Also quoted in Posen, 33. 
107 Ibid. 
108  Ibid. 
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enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and limiting a 
range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that 
democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, 
particularly in countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is 
likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.109 
 This strategy consisted of three elements: defense capability and effective 
diplomacy, the opening of foreign markets, and the promotion of democracy in other 
countries. The strategy also emphasized the importance of the American people’s 
interests, therefore diluting the somewhat altruistic notion of benevolence conveyed in 
political rhetoric. As the Commission on America’s National Interests puts it, “Our 
hierarchy puts American national interests first, as American leaders do when they are 
being forthright.”110 The difference in President Clinton’s policy from his predecessor 
was in dealing with other great powers, whether through competition or cooperation. 
Even  in this case there is no clear delineation because such relations always involve or 
combine competition and cooperation  As a result, the voluntary surrender of American 
primacy would conceivably be politically indefensible. The Clinton administration 
developed the “New Pacific Community” concept as the organizing theme of its 
involvement in the Western Pacific. Under this concept of community, the U.S. 
interaction is based on “three shared commitments: to security, to economic growth, and 
to democratic values” in which “security comes first.”111 The administration defined 
threats as Russia’s transformation, China’s authoritarian regime, weapons of mass 
destruction, rogue states and regional aggression, militant nationalism and ethnic and 
religious conflicts, and transnational problems (e.g., environmental degradation, natural 
resource depletion, rapid population growth and refugee flows, terrorism, organized 
crime and drug trafficking). Military force would be used to defend vital, important and 
humanitarian interests, and when the first two are at stake, force would be used decisively 
and, if necessary, unilaterally. 
                     109 “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” White House, February 1996. 
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm, viewed on 5 December 2003. 
110 “America’s National Interests,” The Commission on America’s National Interests, July 2000, p. 
19. 
111 “Building a New Foundation for Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 
Statement by Deputy Secretary Talbott at the Six-plus-Seven Open Session of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial 
Conference, Bangkok, 26 July 1994, US Department of State Dispatch, 8 August 1992 (www.nexis.com).  
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 The return of the Republicans to the White House in 2001 reinstated the security 
strategy based essentially on maintaining U.S. primacy and preventing the emergence of 
a strategic competitor. The Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 (QDR 2001) reflected the 
Bush administration’s concerns, enunciating one of America’s enduring national interests 
as “precluding hostile domination of critical areas, particularly Europe, Northeast Asia, 
the East Asian littoral [the region stretching from south of Japan through Australia and 
into the Bay of Bengal], and the Middle East and Southwest Asia.”112 The QDR 2001 
implicitly identified China as a potential competitor in Asia, stating, 
Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near future, the 
potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten 
stability in regions critical to U.S. interests. In particular, Asia is gradually 
emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition. … The 
possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will 
emerge in the region.113 
 The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States shifted the focus of its security 
strategy to the threat posed by the combination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
rogue states and terrorists. The National Security Strategy 2002 did not emphasize 
America’s primacy, particularly as the war on terrorism required the cooperation of other 
great powers. As President George W. Bush stated, 9/11 “fundamentally changed the 
context for relations between the United States and other main centers of global power...” 
It is difficult, however, to predict whether America’s war on terrorism has fundamentally 
changed post-Cold War great power relations and the inherent security risks that come 
with it. It is possible that another major terrorist attack on the United States will impel or 
at least inject some elements of neo-isolationism, causing it to scale down its 
international security involvement. Otherwise, the current war on terrorism will 
eventually come to pass (through declaration or routinization) or morph into a different 
kind of conflict, possibly with greater involvement by states. 
America’s war against terrorism has brought its military to be deployed around 
China, either directly or through new and renewed military cooperation with other states.  
The United States in particular is courting Southeast Asia’s maritime region because of 
                     112 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, p. 2. Department of Defense, September 2001. 
113 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, p. 4. 
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its perceived potentials to support terrorism, such as in Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Southeast Asia has, in fact, been identified as a “critical testing ground for implementing 
a ‘third way’ of dealing with China’s rising power—what might be called a strategy of 
‘congagement’ that seeks to integrate China into the international system while both 
deterring and preparing for a possible Chinese challenge to it.”114 
B. INTERACTING SECURITY STRATEGIES: THE “FIRST ISLAND 
CHAIN” AND “PLACES, NOT BASES” 
 The end of the Cold War coincided with China’s growing economic power and 
rising political influence in East Asia’s littorals, a region considered as a traditional 
sphere of American interest. The “first island chain”—the Chinese navy’s blueprint 
objective for expanding its size and mission—epitomizes China’s continental nature and 
seaward projection and maritime aspirations. On the other hand, America’s “places, not 
bases” strategic approach to its forward military deployment symbolizes its position as a 
maritime nation with which regional countries are willing to engage and to host its forces. 
The most important issue in Sino-American relations remains Taiwan, on which other 
regional issues could very well hinge, although the South China Sea remains a strategic 
issue due to its location at the heart of international shipping lanes  that all parties depend 
on for security and prosperity. 
1. Political and Diplomatic 
 As established, in implementing its strategy of multipolarity and balance of 
power, China is seeking closer relations with Southeast Asia. China’s growing power is 
observed in Southeast Asia with concern, but China needs to maintain friendly relations 
with the countries of Southeast Asia, which are already China’s most friendly neighbors. 
An Asian expert on China, Wang Gungwu, describes it in simple terms: “[t]he Chinese 
government realizes that if Southeast Asia fears China, that’s bad for China.”115 In the 
past ten years, China has moved from an observer of ASEAN to a full dialogue partner in 
1996, and the two sides have established various cooperation mechanisms, covering 
                     114 Sokolsky, Richard, Rabasa, Angel, and Neu, C.R., The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy 
Toward China, p. xiii. RAND, 2000. 
115 Ong Hwee Hwee, “China ‘must stay friendly with S-E Asia,’” Straits Times, 6 May 2002 
(www.nexis.com) 
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political, social, economic, scientific and technological affairs among others. Since 1997 
China and ASEAN have met every year at the level of heads of government. At their first 
meeting, President Jiang Zemin and the ASEAN leaders agreed “to promote good-
neighbourly and friendly relations, increase high-level exchanges, strengthen the 
mechanism of dialogue and cooperation in all areas to enhance understanding and mutual 
benefit” and “to resolve their differences or disputes through peaceful means.”116 In the 
late 1990s and early 2000s China and most if not all Southeast Asian countries agreed on 
a framework for future-oriented bilateral cooperation that covers a wide range of fields, 
thus laying the foundation for closer political relations.117 These bilateral frameworks, 
interestingly enough, were established after the tone had been set at the multilateral level 
rather than the other way around. 
 China’s intention to establish closer political relations is also evident in its support 
for ASEAN’s concept of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). China 
has always supported ZOPFAN, even when its relations with many Southeast Asians 
were cool at best;  however, now that support is manifested in real terms. This includes 
its willingness to accede, in concert with the other nuclear weapon states, to the Treaty of 
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone, and  to accede to the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia in October 2003 (the other non-ASEAN country that has 
done so is Papua New Guinea). The accession implies, at least in principle, China’s 
willingness to be bound by ASEAN’s principles and mechanism for peaceful relations. 
China also supported Malaysia’s initiative for an East Asia Economic Caucus in 1993.118 
Furthermore, in 2002 China and ASEAN agreed to establish a free trade area and to 
cooperate in the field of non-traditional security issues, and in 2003 agreed “to hold an 
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ASEAN-China security-related dialogue to enhance mutual understanding and promote 
peace and stability in the Region.”119 
 China has also extended support for ASEAN’s efforts to establish an Asia Pacific-
wide security dialogue mechanism through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Beijing 
seeks the development of a more “Asia-oriented political-strategic landscape” that should 
be managed primarily by Asians with minimum external influence, where China plays a 
role that corresponds to its status.120 As an alternative to the American order in the 
Western Pacific, China circulated a position paper on the “new security concept” to the 
ARF meeting in July 2002, which indicated Beijing’s intention to pursue the idea more 
vigorously after it was first introduced in 1997. As the paper states, the “new security 
concept has become an important component of China’s foreign policies.” Some of the 
principles contained in the concept have been relatively consistent in Chinese foreign 
policy, for example the norms for security cooperation (UN Charter, Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, the leading role of the United Nations), peaceful settlement of 
disputes, respect for territorial integrity, disarmament, and the promotion of common 
prosperity. Others reflect newer trends, such as the reform and improvement of the 
existing international economic and financial organizations, and the emphasis on non-
traditional security areas, such as combating terrorism and transnational crimes.  
Additionally, interesting to note is the statement that the concept may be operationalized 
under “a multi-lateral [sic] security mechanism of relatively strong binding force or a 
forum-like multi-lateral [sic] security dialogue,”121 which seem to indicate China’s 
readiness to move the ARF’s deliberations beyond confidence building and into 
preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. Moreover, China supports ASEAN’s 
leading role in the ARF, implying its preference for the continued leadership of small to 
medium powers. 
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 Beijing makes a concerted effort to consolidate its influence in the Mekong sub-
region, of which most of the countries are also ASEAN’s newer members: Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. S.D. Muni studied China’s relations with these countries 
and argues, 
The new ASEAN countries constitute the land part of China’s southern flank. 
They border China’s sensitive Yunnan and Guangxi provinces and link China 
with strategic waterways in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. China has 
direct access to the South China Sea but not to the Indian Ocean except through 
Myanmar.122 
Among the “CLMV countries” (ASEAN’s jargon for the four new members), China 
maintains closest relations with Myanmar, particularly in terms of defense and 
economics. China has since the early 1990s become Myanmar’s main supplier of 
weapons. Chinese arms strengthen relations with Myanmar’s military, and  its officers 
reportedly go to China for training on a regular basis. China supplies naval 
communications and surveillance equipment installed in naval posts in the Indian Ocean, 
and both countries reportedly share intelligence and defense related information, 
including on the activities in the Bay of Bengal.123 China has also offered support for the 
development of the Irrawaddy River for navigation and commerce, including the 
construction of ports along the river.124 
 China’s relations with Indochina have also progressed at a remarkable speed 
although they depend, to an extent, on China’s relations with Vietnam, which maintains 
strong influence over Cambodia and Laos. Cooperation in the Mekong River is an 
important yardstick of strengthening China’s economic and strategic influence. China is 
an important investor in the development of the Mekong, but it acts primarily on a 
unilateral basis. For example, it plans to build six large dams along the river and another 
nine along its tributaries and to dredge the river to facilitate the movement of goods and 
people with Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia (where the river turns into a 
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waterfall).125 Vietnam, at least in subtle diplomatic settings, has voiced strong objections 
to the Chinese projects, citing environmental concerns as the downstream party. 
However, China’s relations with the Mekong countries are on an upward trend, and they 
have been holding summit meetings since 2002. 
 On the American side, the Clinton Administration supported the forming of the 
ARF, which is consistent with its policy of constructive engagement and with the 
establishment of a “network of overlapping and interlocking institutions.”126 The main 
pillar for American security strategy, however, remained its treaty alliances, military 
arrangements, and military presence.127 As Muthiah Alagappa puts it, “the United States 
supports [regional multilateral institutions] only as a supplement to its alliance 
network.”128 Support for the ARF waned during the Bush Administration’s first year as it 
saw the containment of China as the first security priority. In 2001, the Bush 
administration expressed interest in developing a multilateral security dialogue with 
Australia and Japan, possibly with the involvement of South Korea. 129 Such a security 
arrangement could weaken, or could be perceived by other countries to weaken, the ARF. 
China attacked the idea, suspecting that the security dialogue idea was a prelude to the 
creation of an “Asia-Pacific version of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance.”130 Australia, 
at least according to one account, was cautious  of the idea, with its foreign minister 
reportedly  trying “his best to pour cold water on the proposal without publicly offending 
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the Bush administration.”131 The idea, however, was later put on a backburner  since the 
need to gather support for the war against terrorism had increased the ARF’s usefulness 
for Washington. 
 Perhaps the most lasting impact of U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia is in the 
political field that pertains to the countries’ domestic affairs. During the Clinton 
Administration, issues of democratization and human rights were the centerpiece of U.S. 
policy, justifying interference in domestic affairs. On this basis, Washington publicly 
opposed the caning of an American youth caught vandalizing in Singapore in 1994 It 
further blocked military sales to Indonesia in 1996, imposed sanctions on Myanmar and 
opposed its membership in ASEAN, and openly criticized the Malaysian leader during a 
gathering of Asia Pacific leaders in Kuala Lumpur in 1998. This policy shifted during the 
Bush Administration to one that emphasizes security relationships,  initially in the 
context of containing China and, after 9/11, in the war against terrorism. Both of these 
sidestepped the issues of democratization and human rights and focused on supporting 
the government and its security apparatus. 
2. Security and Military 
 China’s maritime expansion is evident from the priority it places on the navy’s 
modernization. As a PLA senior officer observed, “China’s political and economic focus 
lies on the coastal areas [and] for the present and a fairly long period to come, [its] 
strategic focus will be in the direction of the sea.”132 The primary missions of the 
People’s Liberation Army–Navy (PLAN) are to defend against invasion from the sea, and 
defend China’s territorial waters and maritime rights and interests. China’s political and 
military leaderships have not come out to elaborate China’s maritime strategy; however, 
it is understood to be consistent with the strategy formulated by Gen. Liu Huaqing, the 
commander of the PLAN in 1982-87 and, subsequently, the vice chairman of the CMC 
until 1997. Liu developed China’s “coastal defense” into an “offshore defense” strategy, 
which envisions a theater covering the “first island chain” from the Kurile Islands, Japan, 
Taiwan, the Philippines, Kalimantan, and the Natuna Islands.  Its objective is to be East 
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Enters the Twenty-First Century, p. 159. Naval Institute Press, 2001. 
Asia’s dominant maritime power by 2020, or at least present an effective counter to the 
naval forces of other great powers. Thereafter, China envisions extending its maritime 
dominance to the “second island chain,” which extends from the first chain into the 
Marianas in the Western Pacific. The PLAN’s modernization includes indigenously built 
ships, such as the Luhu-class destroyer, Jiangwei III-class missile frigate, and the Song-
class submarine, as well as imported warships from the Russian Federation, including the 
Kilo-class submarine and the Sovremenny-class destroyer. China is also reported to be 
interested in purchasing Russian Akula nuclear submarines, Slava-class cruisers and 
more Kilo-class submarines.133 China has two naval infantry brigades deployed in the 
East Sea and South Sea Fleets. They were established in 1953 and disbanded in 1957 but 
were revived respectively in 1979 and the late 1990s.  China has also modernized its 
amphibious capability, such as its landing ships and air-cushioned crafts. Another 
relevant capability for power projection is supply ships that the PLAN has acquired, 
although still limited in number. The PLAN tested its logistical capability by sending a 
Chinese guided missile destroyer and its support ship for a four-month voyage around the 
globe in 2002, the first in China’s naval history.134 
 The PLA–Air  Force (PLAAF) is also being modernized, but most observers 
agree that it would take a long-term effort to transform the air force into a regionally-
relevant instrument. The PLAAF has purchased Russian aircraft, in particular Su-27s that 
can act as a deterrent against Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries in the South China 
Sea disputes; nevertheless, they are only of limited value because of the PLAAF 
doctrinal, technological and logistical problems. Indeed, the PLAAF’s strategy seems to 
be focused primarily on national defense, although recent exercises and activities suggest 
an interest in the northern South China Sea and, perhaps, an indication of joint operations 
with the PLANAF that traditionally operates in the area. However, because of past 
doctrine that placed it in a supporting role to the army and operating primarily in the 
interior, the PLAAF has yet to move its air assets closer to the coast  to deter Taiwan’s 
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move towards independence, to protect China from sudden attacks, and to support 
maritime expansion.135 
 American security policy in the early 1990s called for a lower military presence, 
particularly after the closure of American bases in the Philippines in 1992. However, the 
North Korean nuclear crisis in 1992-94 and the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96 convinced 
Washington that it must maintain its presence in the region, even while downgrading its 
military presence in the European theater. The political design mentioned below (in the 
context of the American order) provides and is supported by a robust military presence 
and force structure of around 100,000 military personnel from the Eighth Army and 
Seventh Air Force in Korea, Third Marine Expeditionary Force and Fifth Air Force in 
Japan, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet.  
 The U.S. military force in the Western Pacific is unchallenged and undoubtedly 
plays the “big stick” role for American strategy. The U.S. has at various occasions 
expressed its commitment to maintain its military presence in Asia, including the 
commitment reiterated by Secretary Powell in July 2002 while in Southeast Asia.136 
There was a marked reorientation of America’s naval strategy to a littoral approach as a 
response to the new, post-Cold War situation where “naval power must be applied ‘from 
the sea’ against sovereign transoceanic actors.”137 The naval strategy is aimed at littoral 
projection where “Expeditionary Strike Groups will spread the striking power and 
presence of the United States Navy and United States Marine Corps team more widely 
around the world.”138 The manifestation of this strategy is reflected in the QDR 2001 that 
calls for a focus on the particularly “challenging area” of the East Asian littoral that 
stretches from the Sea of Japan to Australia and the Bay of Bengal.139 The tasks of the 
American military are not only defense but also a wider political role, such as “helping to 
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provide the stability that is so essential to the economic well-being of this complex 
region.”140 
 In January 1998, the United States and China signed the Military Maritime 
Consultative Agreement (MMCA) representing recognition of their intensifying maritime 
coexistence in the Western Pacific. The MMCA is a component of the Defense 
Consultative Talks agreed by Presidents Jiang and Clinton in 1997, and it is basically a 
confidence building measure designed to minimize the risk of incidents at sea between 
the two navies including maritime safety and search and rescue.141 The issue of maritime 
safety and the need to prevent maritime incidents from triggering clashes came to the 
forefront in 1994 when Chinese jets and the U.S. Navy were engaged in a three-day close 
encounter in the Yellow Sea.142 Only three meetings had been held under the auspices of 
the MMCA, one of which was a special meeting prompted by the collision between the 
American EP-3 and Chinese fighter jet off Hainan in April 2001.143 
 The American order relies on military cooperation with regional countries. After 
the Cold War, maintaining large and permanent bases became very expensive, 
particularly in terms of financing and domestic political support in the United States, as 
well as in terms of the political cost for the host government due to strong public 
opposition and regional suspicions. The United States adopted a policy of “places not 
bases” on the basis that “[t]he continued development of support outside the traditional 
basing structure in such nations as Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei will enhance U.S. strategic interests in maintaining 
regional stability and a credible power projection capability in the region and beyond.”144 
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A number of such models have been developed in East Asia to accommodate the U.S. 
military presence: the access model, the burden-sharing model, and the promotion of 
interoperability with its allies.145 The access model manifests in the “places, not bases” 
approach, which is particularly relevant in Southeast Asia. Singapore is a prime example. 
It has built a berth specifically for American aircraft carriers on a commercial basis (to be 
fair, Singapore has also invited China to use the facility). Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand have also provided services to the U.S. Navy. Both the U.S. and East Asian rim 
land countries see the need of America’s role as an anchor for regional stability. 
Furthermore, post 9/11 is a period of strengthened American military presence in East 
Asia. America’s overall post-9/11 military strategy has further strengthened the access 
model. American military planners are moving away from a Cold War containment 
posture against a defined threat “towards a  
focus on speed and overwhelming muscle against emerging crises,” believing that “the 
wave of the future will be smaller facilities known as ‘forward operating bases’ and 
‘forward operating locations.’”146 
 The QDR 2001, noting Asia’s vast distances, the low density of U.S. basing and 
en route infrastructure and “less assurance of access to facilities in the region,” called for 
“securing additional access and infrastructure agreements and on developing systems 
capable of sustained operations at great distances with minimal theater-based support.”147 
As part of the effort for additional access and infrastructure agreements, Washington has 
established stronger military relations with Taiwan, Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and to a lesser extent, Indonesia. The U.S. Pacific Command turned to 
Indonesia to “help in the war on terror … [and] hoped to see the emergence of a 
democracy as part of a defensive bulwark against China if Beijing seeks to dominate Asia 
and drive the US from the Western Pacific.”148 
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 Moreover, while an improving relationship between the United States and 
Vietnam has occurred on its own merit, its value to America’s relations with China 
cannot be underestimated. For example, an American observer, Peter Brookes, 
highlighted a meeting between the American defense secretary and the Vietnamese 
defense minister as a potential signal to China that America intends “to continue to be a 
player in that part of the world.”149 Whereas on systems for sustained operations, 
Washington is considering to permanently move a carrier from the continental United 
States to Hawaii or Guam.150 The strengthening of the American military in East Asia 
and the Western Pacific is conceivably in the context of eliminating terrorism, but as 
strategic and military planners in Washington, Beijing, and elsewhere are aware, the 
military could be used for a host of other purposes, including in this context America’s 
relations with China.  
3. Taiwan 
 Taiwan, the most contentious issue in U.S.-China relations, situates prominently 
in the broader strategic picture. The 1978 communiqué that established Sino-American 
diplomatic relations did not bridge their differences, particularly regarding China’s 
sovereignty over and right to use force against Taiwan and America’s weapons sales to 
the island. Washington and Beijing agreed in the 1980s to put this issue on the 
backburner and focus on Cold War issues. However, Taiwan’s political democratization 
since the late 1980s and, hence, the “localization” of its domestic politics has become a 
wild card that challenges the status quo. In particular, it undermined the American-
Chinese tacit agreement that China would refrain from using force, and the U.S.  would 
not encourage or support Taiwan’s independence.  
 In the first half of the 1990s, Washington’s outlook was significantly prejudiced 
by a host of other issues, such as the 1989 Tiananmen crisis, the collapse of communism 
in Eastern Europe and bilateral issues on human rights, trade, and non-proliferation. The 
resurgence of the Republican Party in Congress in 1994, moreover, further hardened 
Washington’s position. This was also the period when Washington promoted the 
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expansion of democracy and a market economy worldwide (of which Taiwan was an 
ideological example). Against this backdrop, in 1995, President Clinton granted a visa for 
President Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States, preceding Taiwan’s parliamentarian 
elections and, more importantly, its first direct presidential elections. These events 
triggered harsh Chinese reactions and the worst crisis in post-Cold War U.S.-China 
relations. China conducted a series of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait from 1995 to 
1996 to influence the elections and deter any move towards independence. America 
responded by twice sending large naval forces to the waters around Taiwan, warning 
Beijing that any attack against the island would have “grave consequences.”151 
 The crisis subsequently helped to reduce U.S.-China tension over Taiwan and 
encouraged the Clinton administration to pursue a policy of comprehensive engagement 
and strategic partnership with China. The issue entered a new phase with the current 
Bush administration, reflected in the president’s statement in April 2001 that the United 
States would “do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend herself.”152 The statement was 
subsequently moderated to be more in line with the prevailing policy of strategic 
ambiguity—leaving both Beijing and Taipei in the dark on what the United States would 
do if China attacked Taiwan or if Taiwan declared independence and provoked Chinese 
military action. Nonetheless, Washington’s new hard line position is consistent with the 
strategy to deny a peer competitor for which Taiwan plays strategic and geopolitical 
roles. The U.S. is increasing weapon sales to and is developing closer military contacts 
with Taiwan. After 9/11, contention over Taiwan had declined, but all indications point to 
the strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan relations. Taiwan is an important link in America’s 
security chain in the Western Pacific. Any conflict over Taiwan almost certainly will 
involve the United States, spreading into a Sino-American conflict that could spread 
throughout East Asia’s maritime periphery, the choke point for China and America’s East 
Asian allies. 
 
                     151 Clough, Ralph N., Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait?, pp. 1-7. Rowman & Littlefield, 
1999. 
152 Lampton, David M. and Ewing, Richard D., U.S.-China Relations in a Post-September 11th World, 
p. 17. The Nixon Center, 2002. 
  58 
4. The South China Sea and Freedom of Navigation 
 At the center of the South China Sea problem are the disputed claims of 
ownership of the Spratly and Paracel Islands between China (and Taiwan), the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam. The dispute also involves maritime 
boundaries between these countries and potentially with other non-claimants, such as 
Indonesia since China’s claim potentially overlaps with many countries’ exclusive 
economic zones. This dispute is the major problem between China and ASEAN, even 
though not all Southeast Asian countries are claimants, and China’s assertiveness has 
frightened its smaller neighbors. China used arms in these islands: in 1974 to expel 
Vietnam and consolidate control over the Paracels; in 1988 in a brief but intense naval 
battle against the Vietnamese navy to occupy six reefs and establish a naval outpost; and 
in 1992 to seize and occupy an additional two reefs. It also occupied and built a structure 
on the Mischief Reef off Palawan Island (Philippines) in the mid-1990s, purportedly as a 
shelter for fishermen, but it actually represented “the most southerly projection of a 
Chinese presence and the first seizure of territory claimed by a member of ASEAN.”153 
 In 1947 the Republic of China issued a map showing nine undefined, 
discontinued and dotted lines extended from its coastline to all of the South China Sea. 
The initial claim, made at a time when Asian nations were establishing modern states and 
defining the territories and boundaries, was presumably made to cover the islands and 
rocks therein.154 China’s maritime claim is based on the 1947 map;  however, Beijing has 
yet to come out with a consistent position. Its claims to the island groups and to the whole 
South China Sea is inconsistent with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, which China ratified on 7 June 1996 and agreed should be the basis for resolving 
the dispute. China’s claim upon the Spratlys is based on historical grounds of discovery 
and administration, but it cannot demonstrate a continuous administrative presence. Other 
claimants do not have stronger claims, except for effective occupation that Beijing, thus 
far, has not managed. 
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 The fact that territorial disputes in the South China Sea only heightened at the 
beginning of the 1970s indicates that the strategic weight of the South China Sea had 
increased only gradually, commensurate with the increase in the material value (trade) 
that passed through these waters. The initial economic interest was over fishing, which 
began to develop in the early 1950s, while growth in shipping grew in tandem with 
growing trade. By the mid-1980s, China had become one of the world’s foremost 
seafaring countries with a merchant marine “estimated to be at least the fourteenth largest 
in the world in terms of tonnage … In terms of numbers of vessels, China ranked eighth, 
directly behind the United States … [and] may be even higher in terms of true 
ownership.”155 
 Oil is an important strategic factor in the South China Sea, in terms of potential 
offshore reserves as well as passage from the Middle East. China’s seizure of the Paracel 
Islands in 1974 coincided with oil discoveries in the South China Sea. In the 1970s, 
regional countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam began 
offshore drilling. China’s claim over the whole of the South China Sea, which together 
with other claims have undermined the area’s stability, is a result of “a growing 
desperation by Beijing to control the potential lucrative natural resources of the region” 
and, therefore, address its own problems growing out of resource shortages.156 While the 
control of oil and other natural resources is an important consideration for Beijing, the 
territorial claim was made before oil was discovered, implying that energy is a recent 
consideration, and its importance may not have preceded China’s deeper current of 
historical perception. 
 In 1992, China’s National People’s Congress promulgated the Law on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic of China. According to 
the Law, China’s territorial land “includes the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan 
and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha 
Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands and other islands that belong to the 
People’s Republic of China.” China’s claim, moreover, is not limited only to the disputed 
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islands as the law implies claim over the entire South China Sea. As a manifestation of 
concern, ASEAN issued a declaration on the South China Sea in 1992 and again a 
statement in 1995 to voice its concern over China’s actions to enforce its claim. China 
accommodated ASEAN’s position in the latter half of the 1990s when it agreed to 
negotiate a code of conduct in the South China Sea on a multilateral basis, resulting in the 
ASEAN-China Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea in 2002. This improving 
relationship occurred in tandem with overall improvements signified in closer 
cooperation within the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN-China summits, and in the 
bilateral context between China with all Southeast Asian countries. Furthermore, Beijing 
and Hanoi resolved their disputes in the Gulf of Tonkin at the end of 2000. 
 This is not to say, however, that the problem has been resolved. Beijing’s main 
concern, other than its inability at this stage to project credible and sustainable military 
force to the region, is the potential intervention of other great powers, particularly the 
United States and Japan. Therefore, Beijing is interested in calming the fears of Southeast 
Asian countries, but it consistently rejects the involvement of “outsiders.” In addition, all 
parties concerned are interested in freedom of navigation. The United States has not 
directly involved itself in the territorial claims, except for maintaining the importance of 
peaceful resolution and the guarantee of freedom of navigation. The United States 
seriously began to consider the implications of China’s claims in the South China Sea and 
to shape a more assertive policy after the latter’s occupation of some islets in 1992 and 
1995. This occurred at a time of increased concern of China’s growing military and its 
security policies, particularly regarding Taiwan. Stanley Roth, who was then a special 
assistant to the U.S. government, said in 1995 that the South China Sea would occupy, 
henceforth, a higher priority in his government’s dialogue with Beijing.157 The United 
States reportedly “committed itself to using American military force, if necessary, to keep 
international shipping lanes open in the South China Sea.”158 
 On 21 August 1996, the United States sent Beijing a diplomatic note to state that 
Beijing’s territorial claims contradicted international law, therefore indicating 
                     157 Son, Johanna, “China Gets Stern Warning on Spratlys,” Inter Press Service, 2 May 1995. 
158 Kristof, Nicholas D., “The Real Chinese Threat,” The New York Times, p. 50, 27 August 1995. 
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Washington’s new policy of “active neutrality” in this issue.159 Washington also indicated 
that it would intervene if freedom of navigation were threatened.160 For its part, ASEAN 
has stressed the importance of freedom of navigation, at least since 1995, while Beijing 
has also acknowledged the importance of this regime. The United States recently 
objected to China’s enactment of a new decree extending its control over its 200-mile 
exclusive economic zone and prohibiting any survey or mapping activities that can harm 
its national security.161 
5. Trading Powers, Trading Region 
 Trade is an important component for evaluating China and the United States 
relations with Southeast Asia. While strategy and trade do not have direct linkages at all 
times, in times of general peace like today’s post-Cold War period trade and economic 
matters, in general, gain significantly higher importance for states because they affect 
important segments of the population. Today more people are interested in and dependent 
upon trade and trade growth, and all states whose governments, democratic or otherwise, 
are concerned with economic growth will be interested in greater trade. More specifically 
in the strategic realm, trade facilitates closer political and strategic relations, particularly 
where political differences are minimal. As demonstrated above (II.b.1), Soviet naval 
presence in Southeast Asia in the late 1970s and early 1980s could have been better 
sustained if it had closer trading relations with the region rather than simply being tasked 
to deny the U.S. Navy access to the region.  
 Table 2 below provides trade data between Southeast Asia and both China and the 
United States between 1992 and 2001. The table divides Southeast Asia into the Mekong 
and insular/peninsular sub-regions to discern the impact of geography and proximity on 
trade and, in turn, on regional order. Trade trends appear to be drawing China and 
Southeast Asia closer together. As the data show, the growth rate of China-Southeast 
Asia commerce has been rapid, but in real terms the size has been moderate relative to 
                     159 Lee, p. 143. 
160 Dobson William J. and Fravel, M. Taylor, “Red Herring Hegemon: China in the South China 
Sea,” Current History, September 1997, p. 262. 
161 “China Enacts Law Extending Its Control,” Washington Times, 27 January 2003, p. 1, 
http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jan2003/e20030127149431.html 
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their overall trade size. The annual rate of growth in 1992-2001 is between 2 percent 
(2001) and 35 percent (1995), discounting the growth in 1998 after Hong Kong’s 
reversion to China. The growth rate is more rapid than Southeast Asia’s trade with the 
United States. Furthermore, China and Southeast Asia have agreed to start negotiations 
for a free trade area, targeting 2010 as the start date, and they recently set $100 billions as 
a trade target for 2005. Moreover, trade relations are significantly larger between China 
and Southeast Asia’s maritime sub-region than its Mekong sub-region, which comprises 
around one-fourth to one-fifth of the total amount. However, conceivably trade growth 
will accelerate as the infrastructural projects connecting China with the Mekong and up 
to Singapore are concluded; i.e., the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link, the Kunming-
Bangkok highway, the dredging of the Mekong River, and the navigation of the 
Irrawaddy. These projects, moreover, are important to support the development of 
China’s Yunnan Province and Western regions. 
 The United States remains the largest market for Southeast Asian countries. The 
region’s trade with the U.S. almost doubled between 1992 and 2001, from over $66 
billions to $118 billions, generally to the advantage of Southeast Asia. The majority of 
this trade, around 80 percent, takes place with the maritime region, showing the close 
economic relations and dependency it has with the United States. The Clinton 
Administration initiated trade liberalization in the early 1990s by empowering the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), but statistics indicate that America-Southeast 
Asia trade growth did not accelerate, in fact it slowed down after APEC’s trade 
liberalization agreement in 1994. The Bush Administration intends to strengthen 
economic relations with ASEAN, and it has undertaken a number of initiatives toward 
that end, such as the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) launched by President Bush 
and ASEAN leaders in 2002. The EAI “will enhance already close U.S. ties with 
ASEAN” and is aimed at creating “a network of bilateral FTAs, which will increase trade 
and investment, tying more closely together our economies and our futures.”162 As in the 
case with China, Singapore is an agent for Southeast Asia’s trade with the United States, 
accounting for almost one-third of the total amount. 
                     162 “Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative,” Fact Sheet, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
October 26, 2002, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/asean/fs/2002/16605.htm (14 November 2003) 
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 Other than proximity, China’s advantage over the United States also pertains to 
the role played by Southeast Asia’s Overseas Chinese in promoting trade with China. 
Singapore and Hong Kong are centers of Overseas Chinese playing a large role that 
serves as the nexus of financial and transportation networks to and from China. Singapore 
facilitates the trade of other Southeast Asian countries through its port facilities and 
business networks with China. Singapore is also known to have invested heavily in 
China. For example, a number of Chinese ports are jointly managed with the Port of 
Singapore Authority. In 1991, Singapore initiated the Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention, 
which meets every two years, to strengthen the “Bamboo Network” of the Overseas 
Chinese. One of its outcomes was establishing the New China Hongkong Group in 1993 
that brings together businessmen from Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, 
and Thailand to invest in China’s infrastructure, telecommunications and manufacturing 
ventures.163 The Convention also established the Investment Foundation that has thus far 
built, with the cooperation of China’s local government, four industrial parks in China.164 
The role of the Overseas Chinese—described by a Chinese leader as “bridges and bonds 
of ties as China opens up to the rest of the world and steps up its cooperation and 
exchanges with other countries and regions”165—will become increasingly important as 
the China-ASEAN free trade area materializes and expands. 
 The strategies of China and the United States have resulted in their intensified 
coexistence in East Asia’s maritime region. Their grand and security strategies indicate 
that they are in competition and that Southeast Asia is an important competition arena to 
strengthen their influence. The next chapter will look into Southeast Asia’s reaction to 
these strategies, particularly how the regional countries plan to order their region.  
                     163 Rowley, Anthony, “The Emerging Chinese Challenge,” Business Times, 6 December 1993 
(www.nexis.com) 
164 “World Chinese Entrepreneur Convention Plans Industrial Park in Shanxi,” Financial Times 
Information, 21 April 2003 (www.nexis.com). See also, “Scientific Park for Overseas Chinese 
Entrepreneurs Opens in Nanjing,” Xinhua, 19 September 2001 (www.nexis.com) 
165 “China: Full Text of Li Ruihuan’s Speech at the Entrepreneurs Convention,” British Broadcasting 
Corp., 17 September 2001 (www.nexis.com) 
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Table 2.   Trade Statistics between Southeast Asia and China and the United States, 
1992-2001 (in US$ million)166 
(Note: Includes Hong Kong as of 1998) 
 
China U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China U.S.
x … 28.0 … 29.0 … 43.0 5.0 67.0 1.0 76.0
m … 498.0 … 526.0 … 414.0 170.0 262.0 215.0 614.0
x 1,396.0 4,419.0 1,249.0 5,230.0 1,445.0 6,382.0 1,742.0 6,322.0 2,057.0 6,795.0
m 752.0 3,822.0 936.0 3,255.0 1,157.0 3,092.0 1,495.0 4,756.0 1,598.0 5,060.0
x 772.0 7,594.0 1,204.0 9,580.0 1,933.0 12,448.0 1,889.0 15,313.0 1,882.0 14,251.0
m 975.0 6,331.0 1,096.0 7,725.0 1,363.0 9,900.0 1,709.0 12,657.0 1,876.0 12,133.0
x 114.0 3,843.0 167.0 4,342.0 164.0 5,178.0 209.0 6,217.0 328.0 6,966.0
m 184.0 2,626.0 182.0 3,532.0 320.0 4,162.0 660.0 5,225.0 653.0 6,243.0
x 1,113.0 13,396.0 1,905.0 15,074.0 2,098.0 18,093.0 2,759.0 21,576.0 3,395.0 23,062.0
m 2,253.0 11,882.0 2,404.0 13,955.0 2,885.0 15,630.0 4,042.0 18,725.0 4,439.0 21,549.0
7,559.0 54,439.0 9,143.0 63,248.0 11,365.0 75,342.0 14,680.0 91,120.0 16,444.0 96,749.0
9% 17% 21% 16% 24% 19% 29% 21% 12% 6%
78% 82% 80% 82% 76% 82% 73% 83% 75% 83%
x … … … … … … 16.0 5.0 20.0 4.0
m … … … … … … 100.0 30.0 119.0 24.0
x 3.0 6.0 3.0 8.0 4.0 9.0 9.0 5.0 1.0 3.0
m 31.0 1.0 41.0 5.0 40.0 6.0 22.0 2.0 23.0 2.0
x 119.0 38.0 150.0 46.0 130.0 66.0 136.0 79.0 125.0 106.0
m 285.0 5.0 357.0 14.0 406.0 12.0 680.0 18.0 573.0 35.0
x 386.0 7,303.0 430.0 8,005.0 914.0 9,706.0 1,642.0 10,078.0 1,868.0 10,026.0
m 1,219.0 4,776.0 905.0 5,379.0 1,483.0 6,136.0 2,096.0 8,507.0 1,953.0 9,240.0
x 96.0 … 111.0 … 174.0 50.0 362.0 170.0 340.0 204.0
m 32.0 2.0 304.0 8.0 376.0 189.0 330.0 130.0 329.0 246.0
2,171.0 12,131.0 2,301.0 13,465.0 3,527.0 16,174.0 5,393.0 19,024.0 5,351.0 19,890.0
12% 20% 6% 11% 53% 20% 53% 18% -1% 5%
22% 18% 20% 18% 24% 18% 27% 17% 25% 17%
9,730.0 66,570.0 11,444.0 76,713.0 14,892.0 91,516.0 20,073.0 110,144.0 21,795.0 116,639.0
10% 18% 18% 15% 30% 19% 35% 20% 9% 6%











































                     166 Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (1995 and 2002) 
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China U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China U.S.
x 1.0 97.0 3.0 204.0 15.0 391.0 57.0 378.0 136.0 385.0
m 193.0 316.0 38.0 135.0 72.0 174.0 77.0 154.0 75.0 114.0
x 2,229.0 7,154.0 3,697.0 7,046.0 3,339.0 6,908.0 4,322.0 8,489.0 4,891.0 9,916.0
m 1,518.0 5,444.0 1,170.0 3,523.0 1,469.0 2,841.0 2,364.0 3,393.0 3,147.0 2,750.0
x 1,852.0 14,553.0 5,404.0 15,885.0 6,093.0 18,553.0 7,468.0 20,162.0 7,884.0 17,816.0
m 2,232.0 13,246.0 3,367.0 11,444.0 3,784.0 11,414.0 5,501.0 13,668.0 5,696.0 11,839.0
x 244.0 8,856.0 1,670.0 10,145.0 2,522.0 10,493.0 2,570.0 11,406.0 2,373.0 8,994.0
m 972.0 7,624.0 2,499.0 6,561.0 2,266.0 6,366.0 1,986.0 5,325.0 2,212.0 4,993.0
x 4,053.0 23,122.0 13,285.0 21,856.0 12,730.0 22,055.0 16,218.0 23,891.0 16,149.0 18,755.0
m 5,668.0 22,385.0 7,696.0 18,783.0 8,885.0 19,022.0 10,632.0 20,270.0 9,980.0 19,159.0
18,962.0 102,797.0 38,829.0 95,582.0 41,175.0 98,217.0 51,195.0 107,136.0 52,543.0 94,721.0
15% 6% 105% -7% 6% 3% 24% 9% 3% -12%
77% 83% 80% 83% 79% 83% 77% 81% 77% 80%
x 59.0 86.0 69.0 293.0 47.0 236.0 31.0 740.0 22.0 832.0
m 124.0 27.0 196.0 39.0 172.0 38.0 367.0 33.0 204.0 17.0
x … 7.0 7.0 20.0 9.0 13.0 6.0 9.0 7.0 4.0
m 5.0 1.0 29.0 4.0 35.0 1.0 46.0 5.0 70.0 4.0
x 67.0 112.0 97.0 159.0 126.0 222.0 142.0 443.0 147.0 456.0
m 627.0 22.0 537.0 35.0 518.0 13.0 644.0 19.0 617.0 13.0
x 1,744.0 11,154.0 4,554.0 12,175.0 4,840.0 12,667.0 6,280.0 14,706.0 6,161.0 13,246.0
m 2,260.0 8,670.0 2,587.0 6,053.0 3,200.0 6,443.0 4,260.0 7,291.0 4,536.0 7,198.0
x 474.0 287.0 758.0 469.0 982.0 504.0 1,852.0 733.0 1,158.0 1,035.0
m 404.0 252.0 1,003.0 326.0 1,178.0 323.0 1,999.0 364.0 2,578.0 507.0
5,764.0 20,618.0 9,837.0 19,573.0 11,107.0 20,460.0 15,627.0 24,343.0 15,500.0 23,312.0
8% 4% 71% -5% 13% 5% 41% 19% -1% -4%
23% 17% 20% 17% 21% 17% 23% 19% 23% 20%
24,726.0 123,415.0 48,666.0 115,155.0 52,282.0 118,677.0 66,822.0 131,479.0 68,043.0 118,033.0
13% 6% 97% -7% 7% 3% 28% 11% 2% -10%
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IV. SOUTHEAST ASIA’S POST-COLD 
WAR REGIONAL ORDER 
 By the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had left Vietnam and was reducing 
its overall presence in Southeast Asia. The United States, whose presence had been 
framed in the containment policy, was seemingly ready to go home, an indication given 
prominence with the closure of the Subic and Clark bases in the Philippines. A widely 
shared anxiety was present among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and other Southeast Asian countries that a reemerging China and a rearming Japan might 
fill the vacuum. China was a particular concern because of its lack of transparency on 
security matters. Therefore, ASEAN sought to engage the great powers through 
multilateral frameworks, for example the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for security 
matters and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization for economic 
matters. One of the consequences of this approach was diluting Southeast Asia’s 
cohesiveness and identity. Chia Lin Sien predicts, “[i]t is unlikely that the countries of 
Southeast Asia can remain a regional entity in the form of ASEAN if recent moves to 
form larger economic groupings by incorporating the large North East Asian economies 
prove to be the forerunner of things to come.”167 
 The financial, environmental, and political crises in and after 1997, as well as the 
expansion of ASEAN’s membership underscored the need to focus on strengthening 
ASEAN’s cohesiveness in the management of regional order. Meanwhile, the 1997 
financial crisis also strengthened voices within ASEAN for stronger cooperation with 
Northeast Asian powers along with recognition for greater East Asian regionalism. These 
processes question the applicability of ASEAN’s first concept of regional order, the Zone 
of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), at least in its traditional form. Alongside 
greater engagement with and greater autonomy from the great powers, as well as stronger 
relations with Northeast Asia, ASEAN’s primary challenge for regional order will be 
managing the rise of China. As a matter of principle, the region has always been  
                     167 Chia Lin Sien and Martin Perry, “Introduction,” in Chia Lin Sien (ed.), Southeast Asia 
Transformed: A Geography of Change, p. 35. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003. 
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concerned about both intra- and extra-regional affairs, with some countries favoring 
greater reliance on the major powers and others on autonomy. Southeast Asia’s order is 
dynamic with different priorities taking precedence at different times. 
A. OUTWARD LOOKING PHASE, 1992-97 
 The role of ASEAN in managing great power relations to resolve the Cambodian 
problem gave the regional organization confidence in its ability to invite and engage the 
great powers in the maintenance of the region’s stability. In the early 1990s, ASEAN was 
also acutely aware of the need to reach an understanding with the non-ASEAN Southeast 
Asian countries on a regional order. 
 The debate in Southeast Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s regarding the 
continuation of the American bases in the Philippines after the lease expired in 1991 was 
instrumental in forming ASEAN’s position on great power politics. Singapore’s Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs, George Yeo, told the Singapore parliament that the 
American military presence was important to preserve the regional status quo and “until 
ZOPFAN is achieved, a continued U.S. presence in Southeast Asia is desirable.”168 He 
was of the view that Asia’s prospect without U.S. forces for the next 20 years was 
frightening and “[a]ll our hopes for East and Southeast Asia may then come crashing 
down. Japan will be forced to rearm. China and Korea will oppose Japan and a whole 
chain reaction of destabilization will be triggered off in the region.”169 In 1990, the 
ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) proposed in 1990 that the 
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting (PMC) mechanism be used as a forum for regional 
security dialogue, an idea that was picked up by Singapore and Japan, while the United 
States opposed it out of preference for its bilateral defense arrangements.170 The 
Philippines was receptive to a regional security forum similar to the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) while Thailand advocated inviting the 
United States, Russia, Britain, France and China to sign the Treaty of Amity and 
                     168 “Southeast Asia: Unease over Singapore Offer to Host U.S. Bases,” Inter Press Service, 9 August 
1989 (www.nexis.com). 
169 “ASEAN States Differ on Security Outlook,” Agence France Presse, 19 January 1992 
(www.nexis.com). 
  68 
170 Emmers, Ralf, “The Influence of the Balance of Power Factor Within the ASEAN Regional 
Forum,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, No. 2 Vol. 23, 1 August 2001 (www.nexis.com). 
Cooperation. Indonesia and Malaysia were initially doubtful about the usefulness of 
widening ASEAN’s dialogue mechanism to cover the security field, arguing that 
ZOPFAN should be developed to also involve the great powers.171 
 The ASEAN leaders met for their summit in Singapore in January 1992, a few 
months after the United States announced in November 1991 its withdrawal from the 
Philippines. The summit laid the foundation for its post-Cold War strategy, declaring that 
the regional organization “shall move towards a higher plane of political and economic 
cooperation to secure regional peace and prosperity.”172 In the field of political and 
security, they agreed, on the one hand, to establish closer relations with the Indochina 
countries, and on the other hand, “to promote external dialogues on enhancing security in 
the region.”173 In economics, the ASEAN leaders, noting the formation of “large and 
powerful economic groupings among the developed countries” (in Western Europe and 
North America), established the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and underlined the 
importance of “strengthen[ing] existing dialogue mechanisms and develop new ones 
where necessary for the enhancement of economic relations with … especially ASEAN’s 
major economic partners.”174 The ASEAN leaders also strengthened ASEAN’s 
institutional framework—a big step for an organization that is by nature usually shy of 
institutionalism—by agreeing to meet more regularly, to strengthen its secretariat, and to 
designate an ASEAN Secretary-General (from the previously “Secretary-General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat”). 
 A growing consensus appeared by the end of 1992 on a means of improving the 
security framework. The foreign minister of Indonesia, Ali Alatas, gave the first 
indication when he delivered an address in Singapore. It appeared that his statement was 
calibrated to convey a consensus that ASEAN members generally agree on the continued 
presence of the United States as part of a four-pillar structure involving also Russia, 
                     171 Surya Gangadharan, “South-East Asia: Dusting Off the ZOPFAN Idea,” Inter Press Service, 12 
July 1991 (www.nexis.com). 
172 Singapore Declaration of 1992, paragraph 2, Singapore, 28 January 1992, 
http://www.aseansec.org/1396.htm (13 April 2003) 
173 Singapore Declaration of 1992, paragraph 3. 
174 Singapore Declaration of 1992, paragraphs 5-6. 
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China and Japan.175 He anticipated that “it is from the dynamics of this quadrangular 
power relationship … that much of a substance of the security environment of East Asia 
will be derived. And it is from these same factors that South-east Asia must anticipate the 
ultimate threats to its security.”176 To address those threats, he argued for the 
implementation of two concepts. The first one, which has been a persistent theme since 
ASEAN’s founding,  
is subsumed in the policy of enhancing national resilience leading towards 
regional resilience, which is a concept of security that goes beyond military 
considerations alone. It is premised on the belief that, given the nature of the 
perceived threats, Asean security for some time to come will not solely, or even 
primarily, be a military problem.177 
The second concept is packaged under ZOPFAN but “projected for wider regional 
acceptance and application,” envisaged to be “a code of conduct governing relations of 
the states within the Zone among themselves as well as with those outside of it.178 
Foreign Minister Alatas remarked before the first meeting of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum that ZOPFAN, being a flexible blueprint, “is open to further refinement and 
adjustments in light of the rapidly changing global and regional environment. It 
endeavours to address the complexity of the geopolitical and strategic environment of the 
Asia-Pacific while fully taking into account the immense diversity of the countries in the 
region.”179 
 Thus, ASEAN members agreed that the American presence was crucial and no 
longer a serious point of contention. They also agreed that ZOPFAN would continue to 
be acknowledged as the “broadly-gauged framework for greater peace and security” in 
Southeast Asia180 and that the region should be nuclear-weapons-free while respecting 
                     175 “ASEAN Member-States Agree on US Presence in Region: Alatas,” Business Times (Singapore), 
p. 2, 29 October 1992 (www.nexis.com). 
176 “A Vision of Peace in SEA,” Business Times (Singapore), p. 11, 29 October 1992 
(www.nexis.com). 
177 Ibid., “A Vision of Peace in SEA.” 
178 Ibid., “A Vision of Peace in SEA.” 
179 Alatas, ibid., p. 148. 
180 Ibid., “A Vision of Peace in SEA.” 
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nuclear weapon states’ transit rights. Therefore, ZOPFAN would be used to keep the 
major powers “constructively engaged in the region.”181 
 The consensus was further elaborated by the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. 
This is the organization’s annual foreign ministers meeting and its most important 
politico-security institution. Held in Singapore in 1993, the 26th AMM agreed “that 
countries such as the United States, China, Japan and Russia can contribute to regional 
security through the maintenance of stable relationships and the adoption of positive 
policies towards the region.”182 Furthermore, the meeting agreed to institutionalize a new 
mechanism that involved both foreign affairs and defense ministries’ senior officials 
(roughly equivalent to the deputy secretary level in the American system), which is a 
change from the earlier practice that never involved defense officials. This mechanism 
first met in 1992, known as the “special senior officials meeting,” and was ASEAN’s 
preparatory and substantive mechanism for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 
1. Multilateralism and the ASEAN Regional Forum 
 The ASEAN Regional Forum convened its first meeting in 1994 at the ministerial 
level; its preparatory meeting, however, was organized a year earlier in Bangkok during 
which the senior officials of the participating countries drafted the agenda and created the 
forum’s name.183 Experts on Southeast Asia generally agree that the ARF has diluted 
Southeast Asia’s concept of regional order based on autonomy even though, as Chapter II 
above shows, autonomy did not reflect the whole gamut of ASEAN’s concept of regional 
order. As Amitav Acharya contends, “ASEAN came to accept the principle of 
‘inclusiveness’ underlying the idea of cooperative security as an important new norm. 
This meant accepting the dilution of regional autonomy.”184 Michael Leifer questions 
whether “the concept of ZOPFAN applies in its original sense.” While it “was a signal to 
outside powers that they should not intervene, the very nature of the ARF makes them a 
                     181 “Indonesia Revives the Peace Zone Idea,” The South China Morning Post, p. 10, 30 October 1992 
(www.nexis.com). 
182 Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, paragraph 10, Bangkok, 23-24 July 
1993. 
183 The 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, for example, referred to the terminology “ASEAN 
Regional Forum.” 
184 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p. 172. 
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party to the management of regional security matters not just in Northeast Asia but also 
in Southeast Asia.”185 Ralf Emmers argues that ZOPFAN “was made obsolete by the 
establishment of the forum.”186  
 The forum’s formation was part of a larger Asia-Pacific tendency towards 
multilateralism and the generally liberal climate of great power relations. Under such a 
climate, the great powers would for the most part assume that a relatively win-win 
situation  would be attainable in a zero-sum context, achievable through closer and more 
frequent dialogue facilitated by international and regional organizations. Therefore, in 
spite of their intensifying coexistence in East Asia’s maritime region and competing 
concepts of order, China and the United States were willing to engage in a dialogue in 
norms-based multilateral settings. Moreover, countries around the Pacific Rim were 
deeply concerned about the economic situation, especially the promise of “peace 
dividends” after the Cold War. One measure to increase prosperity was believed to be 
free trade, so the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization was 
established to achieve this end. The ARF’s challenge was to maintain not only peace but 
also prosperity.187  
 The ARF was developed as a diplomatic instrument for “denial of hegemony” 
through which to keep the United States engaged and “to lock China into a network of 
constraining multilateral arrangements underpinned hopefully by a sustained and viable 
American military presence.”188 For ASEAN, its approach to the ARF was pragmatic and 
normative based on its own experience in stimulating regional cooperation (the “ASEAN 
way”). It encouraged an early focus on dialogue and confidence building rather than the 
institutional aspect, believing that a rigid institutional process would unravel ARF’s 
existence at its infancy since the major powers’ preoccupation might be with their 
differences rather than with common interests and procedure rather than substantive 
matters. This is particularly true between China and the United States, whose relations in 
                     185 Michael Leifer, interview, “Year 2000 ‘Blows Winds of Harmony to ASEAN 10,’” The Jakarta 
Post, 12 June 1997 (www.nexis.com). 
186 Emmers, ibid. 
187 The first paragraph of The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper states among others: “The 
main challenge of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is to sustain and enhance this peace and prosperity.” 
188 Michael Leifer,  quoted in Emmers, ibid. 
  72 
the first half of the 1990s were troubled by human rights, Taiwan, and non-proliferation 
issues. As a result, at its second meeting in Brunei in 1995, the ARF agreed that it would 
take a “gradual evolutionary approach” consisting of three stages: promotion of 
confidence-building measures, development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms, and 
development of conflict-resolution mechanisms.189 The ARF agreed that it would move 
forward “at a pace comfortable to all,” the forum’s code for bridging the West (Australia, 
Canada, the United States), which wants a faster evolution, and China and others, which 
want a slower one. Although ASEAN countries were deeply concerned about China’s 
ambitions in the South China Sea, they were cautious about pushing it too hard. 
Likewise, decision-making was based on consensus, which implies slow processes and 
avoids outright conflicts.  
 The normative approach is evident from the forum’s 1994 endorsement of the 
purposes and principles contained in ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 
“as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic 
instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and 
security cooperation.”190 Meanwhile, the major powers accepted ASEAN’s central role 
with the provision that it “must always be sensitive to and take into account the interests 
and concerns of all ARF participants.”191 This role facilitated China’s participation, and is 
particularly relevant since for many the ARF was aimed at managing China’s 
reemergence and building confidence among the great powers on sensitive issues, such as 
the South China Sea, Taiwan, and North Korea. Over time, however, especially after the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, ASEAN found it increasingly difficult to maintain its position 
in the driver’s seat, and in some ways, its leading position was propped up by China. 
Western countries proposed to have the ARF chairmanship (thus initiative and some 
procedural control over the agenda) rotated with non-ASEAN members. Premier Wen 
Jiabao raised this point when he met his ASEAN counterpart in Bali in October 2003, 
reiterating China’s support for “ASEAN’s role as the primary driving force of the ARF 
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and its commitment to move the overlapping stages of ARF at a pace comfortable to 
all.”192 Beijing is understandably concerned that if a non-ASEAN country chaired the 
forum, it could increase the chances that the South China Sea and Taiwan, as well as 
other issues of Western concerns, could be raised and discussed in a more in-depth 
manner. Moreover, China’s “new security concept” would likely strengthen ASEAN’s 
norms of inter-state relations. 
 The ongoing discussion on ASEAN’s role suggests that the great powers, and 
China in particular, have an interest in having an honest broker in their dealings and, 
hence, by extension will support Southeast Asia’s efforts to remain autonomous, 
provided that the other great powers continue to be interested in that region. The South 
China Sea problem, however, poses a lingering doubt as to China’s sincerity. 
2. The South China Sea 
 The South China Sea is Southeast Asia’s primary security concern because it is 
the only territorial dispute that threatens to invite China’s military intervention, 
destabilize the region’s geopolitical center, and disrupt the shipping lanes upon which 
much prosperity depends. The South China Sea issue embodies Southeast Asia’s concern 
that China would fill the vacuum created by the departure of the Soviet Union from 
Vietnam and the United States from the Philippines. Beijing’s refusal to discuss the 
problem in the ARF added to that concern. On the other hand, the dispute’s peaceful 
management could act as a catalyst for better Southeast Asia-China security relations.  
 In the early 1990s, the overlapping claims involved ASEAN members (Brunei, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines), a non-ASEAN Southeast Asian state (Vietnam), and 
China. Indonesia, a non-claimant but with its waters adjoining the disputed territory, held 
informal dialogues as a confidence building measure. On 22 January 1990, Indonesia 
organized the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea, a track 
II event that would continue annually until 2001.193 The first workshop was limited to 
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193 Although formally a track II event, the workshops were organized by Indonesia’s Foreign 
Ministry. The foreign minister opened and closed the workshops, while the ministry’s director-general for 
research and development (ambassadorial level, equivalent to deputy/under secretary) chaired the 
workshops’ sessions.  The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the University of 
ASEAN countries, but China, Vietnam, Laos, and Taiwan participated the following 
year. Indonesia’s interest derived from its perception that “Politically, the South China 
Sea is bordered by a region of littoral and hinterland states with an unfortunately long 
history of endemic conflict and strife of recurrent intervention by and interplay with 
nonregional [sic] powers.”194 It is, thus, a continuing source of instability. The 
participants of the workshop, while not formally representing their governments, came up 
with a scheme to defuse tension by shifting attention from territorial disputes to joint 
cooperation. In this context, Premier Li Peng, in a visit to Singapore in 1991, expressed 
China’s position that the disputing claims over the Spratly Islands should be shelved to 
make way for joint cooperation for the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources.195 
 At the fourth workshop in 1993, the Indonesian foreign minister proposed to 
“upgrade” the workshop format and “to engage in a more formal government-to-
government dialogue,”196 but this was opposed by China. The workshop, nonetheless, 
laid the foundation for ASEAN’s position and future agreement with China. In the 
ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea of 1992, the regional organization pledged 
to 
[r]esolve without prejudicing the sovereignty and jurisdiction of countries having 
direct interests in the area, to explore the possibility of cooperation in the South 
China Sea relating to the safety of maritime navigation and communication, 
protection against pollution of the marine environment, coordination of search 
and rescue operations, efforts towards combating piracy and armed robbery as 
well as collaboration in the campaign against illicit trafficking in drugs.197 
 China on its part refused to discuss the South China Sea in the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, believing that this would invite the intervention of other great powers. China was 
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willing to depart from its earlier position of engaging only in bilateral negotiations thus 
entering a “limited multilateral approach” with ASEAN.198 Since negotiations on 
sovereignty would most likely lead to a deadlock, ASEAN and China agreed to promote 
joint development and discuss peace and stability in the South China Sea without 
touching on the territorial disputes, particularly after China agreed to using the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea as one of the bases.199 In 2000, ASEAN and China 
began negotiations on a code of conduct to govern relationships among the disputing and 
other parties in the South China Sea , leading to the adoption of a set of principles for 
conduct in the disputed territory. China agreed to an ASEAN stipulation that the parties 
refrain “from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, 
and other features.”200 However, China’s call for the cessation of military exercises with 
external powers was accommodated only to the extent that Beijing would be notified, on 
a voluntary basis, when they take place.  A look at the developments of events would 
suggest that China’s willingness to stabilize the South China Sea disputes was accelerated 
after the Taiwan Strait crises in 1995 and 1996. 
3. Between the Pacific Rim and East Asia: Growing Fissure in the 
Outward Orientation 
 Free trade was an important post-Cold War consideration for all countries. 
Southeast Asia’s maritime region consists of traditionally trading entities, and this 
encourages ASEAN to pursue greater trade at the intra-Southeast Asia, Asia Pacific, and 
international levels. The ASEAN countries considered the world economic situation in 
the early 1990s as characterized by declining output, decelerating trade growth, and 
uncertain prospects for recovery.201 In 1989, Australia’s Prime Minister proposed  
establishing the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization as a vehicle to 
discuss trade and investment liberalization. ASEAN supported the initiative, provided 
that “ASEAN’s identity and cohesion should be preserved.”202 These are central issues 
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for ASEAN in any kind of outward looking enterprises. Moreover, reflecting the concern 
that Western Europe and North America might create closed economic blocs, ASEAN 
argued against “the formation of an inward-looking economic or trading bloc.”203 
President Clinton’s initiative to assemble APEC’s leaders in Seattle in 1993 created 
momentum for region-wide trade liberalization. In 1993 ASEAN was talking about the 
need for “continued evolution of APEC as a consultative framework,”204 but after 
President Clinton’s initiative, ASEAN “welcomed the efforts of APEC in promoting 
greater economic cooperation and trade liberalization.”205 In spite of the rapid change, 
ASEAN managed to keep its identity, as evidenced by the fact that APEC summits are 
held in ASEAN countries every other year. In the meantime, as a manifestation of its 
outlook orientation, ASEAN encouraged the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996 “as a 
means of establishing strong links between Asia and Europe at the highest level.”206  
 As soon as APEC was created, dissent appeared in the ASEAN ranks spearheaded 
by Malaysia, which wanted to create an East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) and which 
objected to opening East Asia to North American trade while the latter maintained its 
regional trading bloc (the North America Free Trade Area). Malaysia also “resented the 
fact that APEC was an Australian initiative, that it was dominated by Western members 
at the expense of ASEAN, and that it did not reflect the level of de facto economic 
integration achieved within the East Asia region, which by some measures exceeded 
trans-Pacific integration.”207 The United States strongly opposed the EAEG, because 
Washington feared that it would draw “a line down the middle of the Pacific.”208 
Discussions in ASEAN and with other East Asian countries tempered the idea. At 
Malaysia’s urging, ASEAN agreed to promote the establishment of the East Asia 
Economic Caucus (EAEC) on the basis that “consultations on issues of common concern 
among East Asian economies will contribute to expanding cooperation among the 
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region’s economies,” but that the EAEC will be “a caucus within APEC.”209 China 
supported it as an economic forum but not a trade group.210 The EAEC never 
materialized beyond communiqués, and by 1997 the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting 
merely noted “the increasing cooperation among the potential EAEC members and 
expressed the hope that the Caucus would soon be formally instituted for the benefit of its 
members.”211 
 The 1997 financial crisis revived the Malaysian idea, although not the EAEC. In 
1997, ASEAN leaders began to meet with the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea in 
the ASEAN+3 format and, separately, ASEAN+China, ASEAN+Japan, and 
ASEAN+Korea. Significantly, the first ASEAN+3 summit was hosted by Malaysia. The 
ASEAN+3 process resulted in much wider and deeper East Asian relations that were not 
limited to economic matters. At the 1999 ASEAN+3 summit, the leaders pointed to the 
“bright prospects for enhanced interaction and closer linkages in East Asia” and 
recognized that closer relations would strengthen “the elements essential for the 
promotion of peace, stability and prosperity in the region.”212  
 Over the course of the next few years, ASEAN+3 deliberated on ideas for closer 
relations, such as establishing an “East Asia community” and an “East Asia Free Trade 
Area.” President Kim Dae-jung of Korea was the major proponent of closer East Asia 
cooperation, seconded by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia. However, no 
consensus was reached within ASEAN on the pace of integration with the Northeast 
Asian powers. Indonesia and Singapore, for example, did not agree with Malaysia’s idea 
of establishing an ASEAN+3 Secretariat. Indonesia was concerned that a too rapid 
integration would dilute the role of ASEAN and the identity of Southeast Asia, while 
Singapore was cautious about East Asia’s cooperation being at the expense of Southeast 
Asia’s strong relations with the United States and potentially stronger relations with other 
parties, such as the European Union, Australia, and India. Indonesia also objected to any 
                     209 Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, paragraphs 29-30, 1993. 
210 “China Supports EAEC as Economic Forum: FM,” Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 24 
July 1993 (www.nexis.com). 
211 Joint Communiqué of the 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meting, paragraph 39, 1997.  
212 Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation, paragraph 2, 1999. 
  78 
quick formation of the East Asia community and free trade area, preferring a gradual 
approach. Meanwhile, China and Japan were more interested in pursuing their bilateral 
relations with ASEAN rather than on the broad East Asian cooperation. The prime reason 
for the fissuring was China. 
4. ASEAN Plus China 
 ASEAN+China was undoubtedly the most progressive among the “+1s,” in spite 
of the comparatively recent relationship. China became ASEAN’s “dialogue partner” 
only in 1996, even though political consultations had begun earlier. In their 1997 joint 
statement, ASEAN and China agreed that they should “resolve their differences or 
disputes through peaceful means,” including on the South China Sea issue.213 China and 
the Republic of Korea (ROK) committed to “respect and support the efforts of ASEAN to 
establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia.”214 Japan, on the 
other hand, reflecting its strategic outlook, simply “recognized the importance which 
ASEAN attached” to ZOPFAN.215 In 2003, China acceded to the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, implying that China would be legally constrained from 
using force in its relations with Southeast Asian countries. Beijing also committed to 
accede to the Treaty of Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone only after the other 
nuclear weapon states have agreed to it. 
 At their recent summit in Bali in 2003, ASEAN and China agreed that their 
relationship “will serve the immediate and long-term interests of both sides and is 
conducive to peace and prosperity in the region,” therefore, building on this, they agreed 
to establish “a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity.”216 The purpose is “to foster 
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friendly relations, mutually beneficial cooperation and good neighbourliness” on the 
basis that it is “non-aligned, non-military, and non-exclusive, and does not prevent the 
participants from developing their all-directional ties of friendship and cooperation with 
others.”217 This formulation implies that the two sides are not developing binding 
strategic relations and Southeast Asia maintains its autonomy. Nonetheless, the fact that 
their relations have grown stronger signifies China’s growing clout and stature. Another 
part of the agreement commits ASEAN and China to expand cooperation in non-
traditional security issues, to hold security-related dialogues when appropriate, and to 
cooperate closer in the South China Sea.218 
 While on the whole Southeast Asia appears receptive to China’s political 
initiatives, China’s weight in the economic sphere is even more significant. The extent of 
Chinese influence varies between Southeast Asia’s maritime and Mekong sub-regions. 
The Chinese ambassador to Indonesia, Lu Shumin, linked economic to political relations: 
China and ASEAN are geographically close to each other, which constitutes a 
geographical advantage for developing the economic and trade cooperation 
between them. Enjoying good political relations, a solid foundation for 
developing economic and trade cooperation, the two sides have mutual needs for 
each other’s products, since their economies are strongly complementary.219 
 A number of economic trends have occurred in ASEAN’s relations with China. 
First, the bulk of Southeast Asia’s trade with China came from the old ASEAN members, 
which with the exception of Thailand are from the maritime sub-region. As Table 2 
reveals, there was a marked increase in ASEAN’s exports to China, particularly after 
Hong Kong’s reversion to China’s sovereignty and because of the yuan’s stability while 
Southeast Asian currencies fell after the 1997 crisis. Second, China places great interest 
in infrastructural projects in the Mekong sub-region that facilitates exchanges of goods 
and people with its Yunnan province, such as the Singapore-Kunming rail link, the 
Kunming-Bangkok highway, and the dredging of the Mekong/Lancang River. China’s 
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Yunnan province anticipates that its exports of electronic and agricultural products to 
Vietnam’s Haiphong port and, eventually, the international market will increase tenfold 
from the current volume of 500,000 tons after railway connections have been improved in 
2008.220 Beijing also lends support to various ASEAN initiatives for Mekong region 
development.221 Finally, ASEAN has accepted China’s push to create a free trade area, 
after Beijing managed to dispel the concerns of many Southeast Asian countries that their 
products would compete rather than complement each other. When they met for their 
eighth summit in Cambodia in 2002, the leaders of ASEAN and China signed the 
“Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation between ASEAN 
and China.” The agreement lays the groundwork for the eventual establishment of an 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010 for the older ASEAN members and by 
2015 for the newer members.222 The FTA is a “key pillar” in their economic 
cooperation.223 
 Interdependence, therefore, is growing more rapidly in the economic rather than 
politico-security fields. The FTA, however, has a strong political component. According 
to Zhang Yunling, head of the Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, the FTA is a form of “political confidence-building” and a way for 
China to balance and respond to U.S. unilateralism as well as to challenge Japan’s 
economic predominance in East Asia.224 Moreover, the fact that ASEAN countries enjoy 
a surplus in their China trade—at $4.8 billion in 2001 and expected to rise to $6 billions 
in 2002225—makes China even more attractive politically. Singapore’s Straits Times 
projects that “with its [China’s] growing economic might comes political and strategic 
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clout.”226 Even in Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s most independent minded country, China 
“is perceived as a partner and has a welcome role in establishing a new geopolitical 
balance in the region.”227 In Indonesia, China’s share of foreign direct investment 
approvals “rose dramatically to 67 per cent from a previous average of less than one per 
cent.”228 
 There was an apparent concern within ASEAN of growing too close too rapidly 
with China, which in turn sought to maintain the close relations with the United States. 
Singapore is the strongest advocate of having close relations with and maintaining 
balance between the United States and China. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, after 
signing the United States-Singapore Free Trade Area Agreement, called on “the United 
States to be more involved and to embed itself in what he sees as East Asia’s growing 
regionalism … [that] is essential for strategic balance and peace in the Asia-Pacific.”229 
Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew maintained that U.S.-China relations, even 
after 9/11, “are still central to the East Asia strategic balance.”230 The Philippine’s 
secretary of foreign affairs, Blas F. Ople, made a passionate appeal for continued U.S. 
presence, because 
not just the Philippines but Asia as a whole needs America now more than ever. 
The U.S. is helping us fight domestic terror groups and regional terrorist 
networks. It’s keeping the lid on the Korean peninsula. It’s ensuring that sea 
lanes vital to our prosperity stay open … Without them, there would be no 
stability in Asia.231 
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A similar case was made by the Philippine’s under secretary of foreign affairs in 2001, 
who described his country as “the best ally of the US in this part of the world.”232 
B. INWARD LOOKING PHASE, AFTER 1997 
 Those views represent ASEAN’s outward looking orientation and are situated at 
one end of the spectrum. At the other end, other ASEAN countries considered it essential 
to strengthen cohesiveness, particularly after the induction of the new members. After the 
1997 financial crisis, there was an apparent swing back to strengthening internal cohesion 
and identity. The greater focus on the inward-looking orientation took place even when 
ASEAN was continuing its outward cooperation. For example, the Enterprise for ASEAN 
Initiative with the United States and the holding of the first ASEAN+India summit, both 
emerged in 2002. 
1. Membership Expansion, Geographic Division 
 In the early 1990s, the regional organization improved relations with the non-
member Southeast Asians. In 1994, at the 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the foreign 
ministers of all ten Southeast Asian countries met for the first time as one group, during 
which they “reiterated their commitment to building a Southeast Asian community 
through common membership in ASEAN.”233 Similarly, at their summit in Bangkok in 
1995, ASEAN leaders met for the first time with their counterparts from other non-
ASEAN Southeast Asian countries. The ASEAN leaders stressed their commitment “to 
the establishment of an ASEAN comprising all countries in Southeast Asia,” based on the 
TAC and the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord 1976.234  
 There were idealist reasons for their incorporation into ASEAN, such as the 
vision of ASEAN’s founding fathers “that the Association is open for participation to all 
States in the Southeast Asian region.”235 Realist reasons also existed, namely to seek 
strength from numbers and collective action with the hope of  being able to restrain the 
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major powers. Incorporating Vietnam in 1995 not only ended the Cold War in Southeast 
Asia but also enhanced regional solidarity, and in turn opened the way for  incorporating 
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.236 As one observer  said, “once the problem of 
reconciling with Vietnam was overcome, it was as if a logjam had been broken and with 
certainty and a comprehensive policy of engagement in place, it was logical to bring 
together all the Southeast Asian countries.”237 For Vietnam, joining ASEAN enabled it 
“to cope better diplomatically with China.”238  Incorporating the new members brought 
traditional Indochinese conflicts into ASEAN, thus further debilitating the organization 
as it appeared unable to deal with intra-regional problems. These include the traditional 
Thai-Vietnam and Thai-Myanmar antagonism. The challenge is how they would resolve 
those distrusts.  
 Different from the older members who are (except Thailand) from Southeast 
Asia’s maritime region, the new members are located in the continental (Mekong) sub-
region. As indicated in Table 2, their trade with China and the United States is limited to 
around one-fifth to one-fourth of Southeast Asia’s total. They are, nonetheless, located at 
China’s immediate periphery and are subject to direct Chinese influence. Strategically, 
the ASEAN region is no longer primarily maritime and open to mainly U.S. influence, 
but it now contains a continental sub-region that borders China. Moreover, one ASEAN 
member, Myanmar, maintains close political and security relations with China, although 
Myanmari nationalism should not be underestimated. As a result, ASEAN is more 
receptive to Chinese influence in the Mekong sub-region, even though it has also become 
more influential in China’s strategic calculus. A case in point was Beijing’s diplomatic 
involvement when violence broke out in Phnom Penh threatening the Thai embassy and 
Thai interests, almost drawing a Thai military response.239 
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2. The 1997 Crises 
 The 1997 financial crisis hit at the time ASEAN was expanding its membership 
and engaging the Northeast Asian powers with a view to closer integration. Indonesia, 
ASEAN’s largest and most influential member, was hardest hit by the crisis, which in 
turn weakened ASEAN. This was apparent during the East Timor crisis of 1999, when 
the regional organization was unable to deal with the situation, at the cost of diminishing 
international stature. To add to regional rows, in 1997 major forest fires broke out in 
Sumatra and Kalimantan (Indonesia) that blanketed Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore, 
creating an environmental crisis and health issues in these countries. Furthermore, 
instabilities in Indonesia reverberated throughout Southeast Asia, directly affecting the 
region’s attractiveness for foreign investment. The foreign investment record of ASEAN 
especially fared poorly before China’s competitiveness. Furthermore, Indonesia’s 
democracy growing pains and slow economic growth have impacted on its ability to 
control its waters, causing a rise in threats to the region’s waters while inviting an 
increase in foreign naval presence (e.g., India). 
 The economic crisis weakened ASEAN’s ability to integrate the newer members. 
At the same time, the crisis “stimulated a new sense of East Asian regionalism and 
brought the countries closer together.”240 Fred Bergsten called the crisis as “[t]he single 
greatest catalyst for the new East Asian regionalism.”241 The crisis also reduced the 
region’s confidence of the International Monetary Fund over its “mistakes” in handling 
the crisis.242 Furthermore, the crisis weakened ASEAN’s ability to respond as a group to 
trade arrangements with other countries . Consequently, the membership is now divided 
between those that are ready and eager to establish free trade arrangements with other 
countries (Singapore, Thailand and, lately, Malaysia), those that are eager but slow in 
formulating its position (Indonesia, Philippines), and the Mekong countries that are still 
getting their economic system in order. ASEAN decided in 2000 that it would not 
                     240 Tommy Koh, quoted in “East Asia seeks its own voice,” Financial Times (London), 14 May 2001 
(www.nexis.com). 
241 Bergsten, opcit. 
242 “Asia links up,” Financial Times (London), 10 April 2001 (www.nexis.com). 
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formulate a common position; Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore told his 
Southeast Asian counterparts, “those who can run faster must be allowed to so.” 
3. Regional Integration and Regional Identity 
 Southeast Asia’s regional integration and identity moved on two broad fronts: 
economics and politics. The 1992 summit initiated the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 
which went into effect in 2002 and is supported by other  agreements and instruments. 
The 1992 summit also paved the way for sub-regional economic cooperation schemes to 
accelerate economic growth, for example BIMP-EAGA (Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-
Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area), IMT-GT (Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth 
Triangle), and IMS-GT (Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle). In addition to 
AFTA, the organization agreed on a set of measures for economic integration, such as the 
establishment of an ASEAN Investment Area, an ASEAN Investment Plan, and an 
ASEAN Investment Code.243 Economic integration is also supported by the development 
of transportation infrastructure, trans-boundary gas pipelines, power grids, and 
telecommunications networks.244 For trade, according to one estimation, “there has been 
a growing tendency for ASEAN to trade more of its GDP intra-regionally,” starting from 
low levels of intra-regional trade and in spite of the important role of extra-
regionalization.245 
 A major economic undertaking was integrating the Mekong sub-region. At its 
2000 summit in Singapore, the regional association promoted the Initiative for ASEAN 
Integration (IAI) “to narrow the divide within ASEAN and enhance ASEAN’s 
competitiveness as a region … [by providing] a framework for regional cooperation 
through which the more developed ASEAN members could help those member countries 
that most need it.”246. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore gave his reason for 
the IAI, “We know that alone, we are weak if we negotiate with others outside ASEAN, 
                     243 Acharya, The Quest for Identity, p. 150. 
244 Suryodipuro, Sidharto, “ASEAN: The Challenge of Integration, Cohesion, and Maritime 
Cooperation,” Indonesian Quarterly, pp. 214-15, Vol. XXX/2002, No. 2. 
245 Jessie P.H. Poon, “Trade Networks in Southeast Asia and Emerging Patterns,” in Chia Lin Sien, 
Southeast Asia Transformed, pp. 397-99. 
246 Press Statement by Chairman, 4th ASEAN Informal Summit, paragraph 1, Singapore, 25 November 
2000. 
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but together if we can really be integrated we will be strong, and the integration goes 
beyond the normal discussion on free trade area. We’re talking about our physical 
integration as well.”247 The IAI was particularly relevant since it was initiated by the 
proponent of the outward-looking orientation, and it had provided the impetus for further 
actions to integrate the Mekong sub-region, such as the Roadmap for the Integration of 
ASEAN. 
 Apart from economics, by the latter half of the 1990s, it became evident that 
regional integration should run deeper if Southeast Asia intended to maintain economic 
competitiveness. In 1995, the ASEAN leaders made their initial vision for the 
organization, namely “to create a caring, cohesive and technologically advanced ASEAN 
community, whose strength lies in a common regional identity.”248 The vision was further 
developed into the lofty ASEAN Vision 2020. It envisioned the association to be, by 
2020, “a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward-looking, living in peace, stability 
and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a 
community of caring societies.” The vision was formulated before the full impact of the 
1997 financial crisis became evident. Afterwards, it was clear that Southeast Asia needed 
deeper integration to stay competitive and maintain its identity. Thus, in the late 1990s 
the organization agreed that “the challenges posed by its expansion, human rights, 
governance, and the environment” required efforts “guided by the larger interest of 
ASEAN mutual solidarity, unity and cohesion.”249 
 The natural consequence was to discuss the possibility of adjusting or jettisoning 
ASEAN’s tradition of non-interference and, instead, embrace “constructive intervention.” 
The proposal made in the late 1990s by Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar 
Ibrahim, Philippine Foreign Minister Domingo Siazon, and Thai Foreign Minister Surin 
Pitsuwan, intended primarily to enable ASEAN to change the political and economic 
systems of the newer members. The proposal, however, was turned down by the other 
ASEAN members. As a compromise, the foreign ministers reached an understanding, 
                     247 “Leaders launch ‘Initiative for ASEAN Integration’” Channel NewsAsia, 25 November 2000 
(www.nexis.com). 
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during their annual meeting in Manila in 1998 on the basis of a proposal by the 
Indonesian foreign minister to undertake “enhanced interaction.” The first consequence 
of this understanding was the establishment of a new practice called, in the ASEAN 
parlance, the “foreign ministers’ retreat.” The first retreat in 1999 held “frank and candid 
discussions on the need for ASEAN to adapt to the challenges posed by its expansion, 
human rights, governance, and the environment.”250 Retreats were held every year to 
discuss sensitive and strategic issues that generally were not revealed to the public until 
consensus had been reached. In addition to the retreat, the foreign ministers agreed to set 
up an “ASEAN Troika” on a case-by-case basis. The troika system of past, current, and 
next chairmen was first used to address the Cambodian crisis of 1997-98. Prime Minister 
Chuan Leekpai of Thailand proposed at the 1999 ASEAN summit in Manila to institute 
the troika. Subsequently, it was adopted at the 33rd AMM in Bangkok, “to address more 
effectively and cooperate more closely on issues affecting regional peace and 
stability.”251 
 A conscious effort to strengthen regional cohesion is the resolution of territorial 
disputes. This process was spearheaded by Indonesia and Malaysia, which submitted 
their dispute over Sipadan and Ligitan islands to the International Court of Justice, whose 
decision in 2002 ended the dispute. Indonesia and Vietnam agreed on their maritime 
boundaries in May 2003,252 while Malaysia and Singapore have also agreed to bring their 
dispute over Pedra Branca (Pulau Batu Puteh) to the ICJ. Indonesia and the Philippines 
have begun negotiations to determine their maritime boundaries.253 In the past, Southeast 
Asians generally opted to set aside territorial disputes in order to focus on common 
interests and build confidence. After the Cold War and as the UN Convention of the Law 
of the Sea goes into force, the resolution of these disputes become essential for regional 
cohesion, particularly since territorial disputes are one of the biggest sources of 
                     250 Chairman’s Press Statement on ASEAN 3rd Informal Summit, Manila, 28 November 1999. 
251 “Foreign ministers approve setting up of Troika,” Business Times (Malaysia), 26 July 2000 
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253 “RI, RP to discuss maritime borders next month,” Jakarta Post, 4 January 2002, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com (4 January 2002). 
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conflicts.254 The resolution of intra-ASEAN territorial problems will be important when 
discussing the South China Sea problem with China. This was demonstrated during 
negotiations for the code of conduct in the South China Sea, 2000-2002, when 
procrastination more often occurred within ASEAN than between ASEAN and China. 
 Recently, ASEAN took another step to strengthen regional integration through the 
agreement to establish the “ASEAN Community” based on the security, economic, and 
socio-cultural aspects. True to the outward-inward dynamics within ASEAN, the security 
community would be based, on the one hand, on the understanding of the ARF as “the 
main forum for regional security dialogue, with ASEAN as the primary driving force,”  
and, on the other, on the exploration of innovative ways to increase security through 
“norms-setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict 
peace building.”255 A wholly new issue pertains to maritime cooperation, which has never 
been considered before as an overarching issue. The summit stated, 
Maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and therefore shall be 
addressed regionally in [sic] holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner. 
Maritime cooperation between and among ASEAN member countries shall 
contribute to the evolution of the ASEAN Security Community.256 
President Megawati in her press statement added, “”we underlined the need to establish 
an ASEAN maritime forum.”257 The relevance of the maritime forum is to bridge the gap 
between ASEAN political and economic ministers, between ASEAN as a political zone 
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 In sum, ASEAN’s post-Cold War regional order strategy oscillated between 
outward and inward orientations. The outward strategy occurred at the time of 
uncertainties about China’s intentions and, therefore, a great need to maintain U.S. 
presence. On the other hand, a primarily inward looking strategy was undertaken when 
cohesion and identity became urgent as China was growing into the region’s 
indispensable power and the region was in danger of losing its identity. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 People in Southeast Asia realize that, as their history of the last half a millennium 
has taught them, great power presence is not a matter of choice but a fact of life, and that 
the region’s order is a function of great power interaction. The end of the Cold War, 
therefore, marked the end of an era in the region’s history, and it was greeted with both 
relief and anxiety. The region had been spared from the possibility of nuclear exchanges 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, but it was uncertain how regional 
security would evolve in light of China’s reemergence and the U.S. response to it. 
Southeast Asians are keenly aware that while the Soviet Union (until its demise) and the 
United States have always been free to choose to be in the region, they are not of the 
region as China is.  
 In the post-Cold War era, great power relations increasingly are focused at the 
regional level. Therefore, the security concerns of regional countries and the great 
powers, as well as their strategies to address those concerns, are best understood through 
a regional approach. The review in Chapter I of various concepts reveals a consensus 
among observers that geography, particularly geographic propinquity, is an essential 
element in the security calculations of regional countries and the great powers. A 
geopolitical approach has been revived in theoretical constructions and policy 
formulations. 
 This thesis discovered that Southeast Asia’s regional order—that is, its mode of 
conflict management—is the result of interaction between its inward- and outward-
looking orientations. Under this framework, Southeast Asia’s concept of regional order 
during the Cold War could be divided into two phases. In the first phase, 1967-78, the 
regional order was significantly inward looking, indicated by the adoption of the concept 
of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) by the first ASEAN summit in Bali in 1976. The 
ZOPFAN concept envisaged limiting great power presence and influence as a way to 
keep the peace. Differing security interests, however, made the observation and 
implementation of ZOPFAN difficult. Countries like Indonesia and Malaysia tended 
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towards maintaining the region’s neutrality and freedom of action because their security 
concerns were primarily internal. Countries like Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand 
were more concerned about external threats and needed the protection of the United 
States and other Western powers in a security arrangement. In the latter portion of this 
period, great power relations were characterized by rapprochement between the United 
States and China and by relaxation of tension between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. 
 Drastic changes came after 1978 with Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and the 
Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan that stoked tensions between China and the United 
States versus the Soviet Union. Heightening Cold War tensions had strengthened 
relations between China, the United States and ASEAN but had divided Southeast Asia 
between ASEAN and Vietnam-led portion of Indochina. This is the second phase of 
ASEAN’s order that lasted until 1992, and it was signified by diluting its autonomy for 
the sake of maintaining close relations with the Sino-American camp to oppose 
Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. 
 After the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia continued its outward-looking path 
until 1997 when it refocused its priority on its inward orientation. The outward 
orientation reflected the concern about unstable great power relations. A review of China 
and the U.S. security strategies in Chapter III reveals their intensifying interaction and 
coexistence in the Western Pacific, creating a strategic competition that is unpredictable 
and possibly be unstable. China is a continental country seeking to consolidate its 
influence in its continental neighborhood in Central and Southeast Asia while expanding 
it in East Asia’s maritime region. China is increasingly dependent on Southeast Asia’s 
waters for its security and economic well being. The United States seeks to prevent the 
rise of a peer competitor and identifies China as one of the most likely future competitors. 
While China’s maritime security is based on the “first island chain” strategy, the U.S. 
strategy is based on the “places, not bases” approach that widens the U.S. presence in 
Southeast Asia. 
 Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing has sought to create a stable environment 
to facilitate its economic development. This effort was accelerated in the mid-1990s, 
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conceivably encouraged by the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96 that brought China and 
the United States into near confrontation. China engaged Southeast Asia more closely in 
security and economic matters through the ASEAN+China framework established in 
1997. The United States, on the other hand, is the post-Second World War primary power 
in the region and ASEAN has been predisposed towards the United States. The U.S. 
military is the ultimate guarantor of East Asia’s maritime order, most notably evident in 
the South China Sea territorial disputes. In this case, the United States pressured the 
claimants, particularly China, not to use force. The United States, however, has little 
security influence over Indochina, except in Thailand, while it is relatively diminishing in 
the insular/peninsular sub-region compared to China’s. Similarly, in the economic sphere 
Southeast Asia’s trade with China has grown at a much faster rate than with the United 
States. If in the early 1990s America’s trade with Southeast Asia was about seven times 
larger than China’s, by 2001 it was only two times larger because China’s trade with 
Southeast Asia has been growing much faster than America’s trade with this region. 
 The end of the Cold War strengthened the ASEAN’s outward orientation. 
Regional countries were anxious that a reemerging China might seek to fill the vacuum 
left by the Soviets and Americans. Moreover, the promise of “peace dividends” 
encouraged ASEAN countries, which were mostly dependent on international trade for 
prosperity, to strengthen ties with other countries and regions. They were also concerned 
that Western Europe and North America were forming closed trading blocks. Finally, 
there was a general consensus on the need to engage all the great powers. Even ASEAN 
countries that championed regional autonomy, such as Indonesia, agreed to a balance of 
engagement with China, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the United States. A fissure 
emerged, in fact, in the outward orientation after Malaysia pushed for the establishment 
of an East Asia Economic Group. This idea was not supported within ASEAN and 
beyond, although it later reemerged as ASEAN+3, which was centered upon 
ASEAN+China relations. 
 After 1997, three developments had weakened ASEAN’s outward orientation. 
The first was the expansion of ASEAN’s membership to include Vietnam (1995), Laos 
and Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999). ASEAN thus not only became a regional 
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organization divided geographically, politically, and economically, but it had also 
expanded to China’s border and sphere of interest. The second development was the 1997 
financial crisis, followed by political crises in a number of ASEAN members, that 
weakened ASEAN’s ability to maintain the region’s order and identity. At the same time, 
the crisis made the region much more susceptible to China’s advances. In this context, the 
third development was Southeast Asia’s increasing perception of China’s indispensability 
for the region’s economic well-being and security.  
 The 1997 crisis became a turning point for a more inward looking orientation. 
Economically and politically, Southeast Asia moved to strengthen regional integration 
and regional identity. These are evidenced in various initiatives in the latter 1990s and 
early 2000s. Among the central efforts was fashioning closer integration between the 
newer members in the Mekong sub-region and the ASEAN traditional geographical core 
in the insular/peninsular sub-region, to prevent the Mekong countries from integrating 
more rapidly with China than within ASEAN. Therefore, ASEAN’s decision to transform 
into a security community was a natural evolution for closer integration and a stronger 
identity to address the divisive impact of Sino-American strategic competition.  
The idea of Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) 
can and will remain as an important guidance, not entirely as ZOPFAN’s authors had 
intended more than three decades ago but as ASEAN’s post-Cold War strategists has 
adapted to deal with great power realities. Although the Cold War has ended, geopolitical 
realities remain, that Southeast Asia is a great powers’ arena and, therefore, the key issue 
is how to manage peaceful relations within the region, by both regional countries and the 
great powers. ASEAN’s successful integration will contribute to the region’s role as a 
buffer in, and catalyst for, a more stable Sino-American competition. 
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